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Abstract
This thesis contains three theory essays on the role of contracting in financial mar-
kets. The first essay, called Procyclical Promises, shows that in the presence of two
contracting frictions—capital diversion and renegotiation—increasing the cyclicality of
an entrepreneur’s output can increase his debt capacity with potentially important
implications for the macroeconomy and government policy. The second essay, called
The Downside of Public Information in Contracting, studies a principal-agent prob-
lem with a verifiable public signal. It demonstrates that when agents are competitive,
decreasing the precision of the public signal can be Pareto improving in a wide class
of environments. We apply the framework to a problem of delegated portfolio man-
agement and argue that our results suggest that regulators should insist that credit
ratings agencies coarsen their ratings categories. The third essay, called Credit Market
Competition and Corporate Investment, uses a general equilibrium framework to study
the effect of the price and supply of credit on firms’ project choices. It shows that for
only intermediate levels of credit market competition do firms choose efficient projects.
3
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my advisors Jean-Pierre Zigrand and Balazs Szentes. Eight years
ago I took a summer course with JP and he inspired me to become an economist.
He has been an exemplary primary advisor throughout my PhD. He forced me to
be independent and he demanded I develop my own opinions. But he also thought
seriously about my ideas when I described them to him and he responded with insightful
(and sometimes severe) criticism.
Balazs made spirited, direct demands of my work and I learnt a lot trying to meet
them. He would ask impossible questions and remain unsatisfied until I found an
answer. Defending my work to Balazs was always a pleasure. His aggressive yet fair
probing made me understand my own work better.
The essays in my thesis benefited from conversations with many people, notably Ron
Anderson, Ulf Axelson, the late Sudipto Bhattacharya, Bruno Biais, Max Bruche, Mike
Burkart, Jon Danielsson, Amil Dasgupta, Philip Dybvig, Erik Eyster, Jack Favilukis,
Daniel Ferreira, Ste´phane Guibaud, Radha Gopalan, Denis Gromb, Christian Julliard,
Ohad Kadan, John Kuong, Kai Li, Dong Lou, Igor Makarov, Ian Martin, Marc Martos-
Vila, Adrien Matray, John Moore, Philippe Mueller, Francesco Nava, Bob Nobay,
Clemens Otto, Daniel Paravisini, Paul Pfleiderer, Christopher Polk, Ronny Razin,
4
Antoinette Schoar, Alan Schwatz, Joel Shapiro, Rob Shimer, Dimitri Vayanos, David
Webb, Wei Xiong, Kathy Yuan, Kostas Zachariadis, and Stefan Zeume. Anjan Thakor
is a co-author on the last chapter and I have learnt a lot from working with him. I
would also like to thank my friend Colm Friel for hundreds of hours of discussion about
economics, especially for patiently explaining to me how financial markets and central
banks really work.
Thanks to my parents for continuous support. My dad, at eight-six-years-old, still
reads everything I write with a scrupulous eye. His understanding remains the best
test of whether I am making good sense.
I owe the most to Giorgia Piacentino. When she and I were first-year PhD class-
mates she scribbled a note to me during class that redefined my approach to research.
I had asked the professor a question about quadratic variation (which I thought was
fairly smart-sounding) only to have Gio write “Think as an economist!” on the paper
in front of me. Later we revised together, and I learnt to think like an economist while
I relearnt corporate finance from her. In the meantime, she became my co-author and
my girlfriend. She extracts the best from me at every level of scholarship. It is a





2 Procyclical Promises 12
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.1 Background Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.2 Goods, Players, and Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2.3 Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.4 Stage Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.5 Solution Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.6 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2.7 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.1 Investors’ Indifference Condition and Price Bounds . . . . . . . 33
2.3.2 Renegotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6
2.3.3 Capital Diversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.4 Collateral Multiplier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.5 Entrepreneurs Borrow to Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.6 Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4 Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.1 Complete Markets/Perfect Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.2 No Borrowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.3 Renegotiation without Capital Diversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.4.4 Capital Diversion without Renegotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5 Welfare and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.1 Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.2 Taxes and Subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6 Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.6.1 Framework and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.6.2 Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.6.3 A Natural Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.8 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.8.1 Proof of Lemma 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.8.2 Proof of Lemma 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.8.3 Proof of Lemma 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.8.4 Proof of Lemma 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.8.5 Proof of Lemma 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7
2.8.6 Proof of Proposition 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.8.7 Proof of Proposition 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3 The Downside of Public Information in Contracting 66
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4 An Example: Portfolio Choice with Quadratic Utility . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4.2 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.6 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.6.1 Proof of Lemma 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.6.3 Computation of Optimal Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.6.4 Computation of the Social Planner’s Weight . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.6.5 Computation of Expected Utility Given ρ . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4 Credit Market Competition and Corporate Investment 104
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2 Toy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.3.1 Agents and Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8
4.4.1 Background Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.4.2 First-Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4.3 Second Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.6 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.6.1 Proof of Lemma 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.6.2 Proof of Lemma 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.6.3 Proof of Proposition 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.6.4 Proof of Proposition 39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140





The three essays in this thesis study the connection between individual contracting
frictions and the larger economy. The first essay shows that limits on borrowers’ com-
mitment create risk premia for procyclical capital goods and generate fluctuations in
capital prices and output. The second essay shows that competition among privately
informed agents can prevent them from providing valuable insurance to their clients.
The third essay shows that some competition among creditors can mitigate the incen-
tive distortions that debt creates for borrowers, but that high competition can lead to
new inefficiencies.
In the first essay, called Procyclical Promises, I construct a model of endogenous
borrowing constraints based on limited repayment enforcement. It shows that en-
trepreneurs’ output procyclicality increases their debt capacity, causing fluctuations in
capital prices and expected aggregate output. Because project liquidation values are
high when capital is expensive, creditors are more willing to finance projects that pay
off in booms. Hence, procyclical entrepreneurs stretch their endowments further with
leverage, allocating more capital to productive projects and driving up the price of
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capital in the market. Procyclical assets are good collateral and trade at a premium
in equilibrium. Even though the worst recessions occur after credit booms in which
procyclical firms are highly levered, borrowing is inefficiently low from the second-best
perspective.
In the second essay, called The Downside of Public Information in Contracting,
Giorgia Piacentino and I propose a model of delegated investment with a public signal
that suggests that (i) contracts do not have to refer to the public signal in order to
overcome incentive problems; (ii) contracts include references to the public signal not
to address incentive problems, but rather to help agents compete; and, in contrast to
the contracting literature, (iii) decreasing the precision of the public signal leads to
Pareto improvements. We apply this framework to a problem of delegated portfolio
choice in which contracts make references to credit ratings. Our model suggests that
wider rating categories make everyone better off.
The third essay, called Credit Market Competition and Corporate Investment, is
joint with Giorgia Piacentino and Anjan Thakor. It develops a general equilibrium
model to examine how interbank competition influences the types of projects bor-
rowing firms invest in. There are two main results. First, at low levels of interbank
competition, firms invest excessively in (riskier) specialized projects, whereas at high
levels of interbank competition, firms invest excessively in (safer) standardized projects.
Efficient project choices arise in equilibrium for only intermediate levels of competition.
Second, the emergence of relationship lending eliminates the inefficiency for low levels





Does a firm’s dependence on the macroeconomy affect its ability to borrow? Does the
price of an asset depend on the cyclicality of its output? Can regulating debt levels in-
crease social welfare? The literature suggests that countercyclical output loosens firms’
borrowing constraints; that procyclical assets trade at a discount; and that limiting
leverage can increase welfare. (See, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Sharpe (1964),
and Stein (2012).) This paper shows that in the presence of two contractual frictions—
capital diversion and renegotiation—these established conclusions are invalid. In the
model below, the more procyclical is a borrower’s output, the higher is his debt ca-
pacity; capital is more expensive when invested in procyclical projects; and taxing
countercyclical industries to subsidize procyclical industries increases utilitarian wel-
fare.
The setting is an infinite-horizon economy with two goods, capital and a consump-
tion good called fruit. Capital plays a dual role: it produces fruit and secures loans.
Capital is the only collateral. At each date, productive entrepreneurs pledge capital
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to borrow fruit from less-productive investors. Each entrepreneur uses this credit to
buy more capital and invest in a risky project. Before his project bears fruit, the
entrepreneur learns whether his project has succeeded. At this point he may divert
capital. Diversion entails early project liquidation and comes at the expense of future
fruit revenues. Next, the entrepreneur can renegotiate his debt, making his creditor
a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If the creditor rejects the offer, he seizes the capital behind
the loan and liquidates at the market price. An entrepreneur considering diversion
faces a trade-off: to divert and forgo future revenues or to continue and make debt
repayments.
In equilibrium, the entrepreneur always diverts capital when he learns his project
has failed, since he gains nothing from continuing. Repayment is nil regardless of the
price of capital. When an entrepreneur learns that his project has succeeded, he has
the incentive to keep his capital in productive use because it will bear fruit in the
future. Thus he continues his project and proceeds to renegotiate repayments with his
creditor.
A project is called procyclical if expected aggregate output is high when it succeeds
and a project is called countercyclical otherwise. In equilibrium, capital prices move
one-for-one with expected aggregate output. Therefore, a procyclical entrepreneur puts
his creditor in a strong bargaining position in the event of renegotiation, since valuable
collateral backs his promise when he succeeds and has the incentive not to divert
capital. Creditors can extract repayment effectively from procyclical entrepreneurs
and therefore lend relatively freely to them.
To see why procyclicality increases debt capacity, suppose first that an entrepreneur
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has a procyclical technology that fails in recessions, when capital is cheap, and succeeds
in booms, when capital is dear. In a recession, he fails, so he diverts capital and makes
no repayment. In a boom, he succeeds and has the incentive to continue. Now capital
prices are high and creditors can threaten to seize valuable collateral to extract a high
repayment from the entrepreneur.
In contrast, consider an entrepreneur with a countercyclical technology that suc-
ceeds in recessions and fails in booms. In a recession, he succeeds so he continues
his project and makes a repayment. However, because capital is cheap, his creditor
assumes a weak bargaining position and the repayment is low. In a boom, he fails,
so he diverts capital and leaves his creditor empty-handed. He diverts capital when it
is most valuable. Such a countercyclical entrepreneur repays only in recessions, when
capital prices are low.
The comovement between project success and capital prices determines the value
of an entrepreneur’s repayment promise. If two entrepreneurs differ only in their
projects’ cyclicality, then the more procyclical entrepreneur’s expected repayment is
higher than that of the more countercyclical entrepreneur. The reason is that pro-
cyclical entrepreneurs continue their projects and make repayments exactly when their
creditors have high capital liquidation values and thus extract more from renegotiation.
Creditors are thus more willing to lend to procyclical entrepreneurs ex ante.
What are the aggregate consequences of such capital diversion and renegotiation?
To answer this question, I build a dynamic economy that embeds the bilateral relation-
ships between investors and entrepreneurs described above. To isolate the effects of the
enforcement frictions in connection with entrepreneurs’ cyclicality, I allow only the dis-
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tribution fruit endowments to change from date to date. The types of players and their
technologies are time invariant. Two types of entrepreneurs are born every period: pro-
cyclical entrepreneurs and countercyclical entrepreneurs. Investors are infinitely lived
with a deterministic, decreasing-returns-to-scale technology that produces fruit from
durable capital. Entrepreneurs live for just two periods. When they are young, they
borrow and buy capital to invest in risky, constant-returns-to-scale technologies. When
they are old, they either divert capital or produce, then they renegotiate their debts,
sell their capital, and consume. The exogenous variation in the model comes from only
the random allocation of entrepreneurs’ endowments. At each date, one of three states
realizes: either no entrepreneurs have endowments, only procyclical entrepreneurs have
endowments, or only countercyclical entrepreneurs have endowments.
In equilibrium, an entrepreneur with zero endowment cannot borrow and therefore
does not produce. The reason is that even though entrepreneurs can make more pro-
ductive use of capital than investors, entrepreneurs never repay more than the market
value of their capital, given that they make the renegotiation offer. Therefore, only
entrepreneurs with positive endowments hold capital; hence, capital is invested in pro-
cyclical projects whenever procyclical entrepreneurs have endowments and, likewise,
capital is invested in countercyclical projects whenever countercyclical entrepreneurs
have endowments.
The second main result is that capital is more expensive when it is invested in pro-
cyclical projects than when it is invested in countercyclical projects. The mechanism
is as follows: because procyclical entrepreneurs can borrow more than countercyclical
entrepreneurs, they buy more capital to scale up their projects. The residual capi-
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tal supply held by investors is thus lower when procyclical entrepreneurs invest than
when countercyclical entrepreneurs invest. Decreasing the quantity of capital left for
investors drives up its price since investors’ technology has decreasing returns. This
price premium for procyclical capital is a collateral premium. Entrepreneurs borrow
more against procyclical capital, buying more capital on margin and driving up its
price.
The difference between capital prices at dates when procyclical entrepreneurs have
endowments and when countercyclical entrepreneurs have endowments results from
only the interaction between capital diversion and renegotiation. Only the combination
of the two frictions makes high capital prices a valuable threat for creditors when
entrepreneurs succeed but not when they fail. Consequently, such price fluctuations are
absent in the four natural benchmark models—namely in the same economy but with
perfect contractual enforcement, with no borrowing whatsoever, with renegotiation
but without capital diversion, and with capital diversion but without renegotiation.
Macroeconomic fluctuations are endogenous in the sense that they appear only as a
result of the two limits to contractual enforcement together.
I proceed to study welfare and to suggest a policy intervention. The main result
of this analysis is that a social planner aiming to maximize output would wish to
transfer countercyclical entrepreneurs’ endowments to procyclical entrepreneurs. The
reason is that procyclical entrepreneurs stretch their endowments further than coun-
tercyclical entrepreneurs do. Thus transferring wealth to procyclical entre-preneurs ex
ante yields a superior allocation of capital in aggregate. Such a tax-subsidy scheme
causes higher leverage and more investment in risky projects, since it has the effect
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of moving capital away from investors who have safe (but unproductive) technologies.
Even though realized output is lowest when heavily levered entrepreneurs’ projects fail,
the intervention induces higher leverage ex ante only to deepen such output troughs.
Thus the prescription casts doubt on unqualified macro-prudential regulatory policies
advocating capping leverage in booms to smooth output: while leverage may lead to
crises, it may still be inefficiently low due to private enforcement constraints. Note
further that a social planner who can levy ex post taxes on procyclical entrepreneurs
can implement an ex ante Pareto improvement by transferring wealth back to counter-
cyclical entrepreneurs after the procyclical entrepreneurs have used their endowments
to borrow and produce.
While my results contrast with some established conclusions in the literature, the
frictions I study are ubiquitous in the real world and my main predictions are consistent
with empirical findings. In most finance models, such as the CAPM, procyclical assets
trade at a discount because risk-averse investors cannot diversify away the systematic
risk they add to portfolios. To focus on enforcement frictions, I assume that agents are
risk-neutral and I thereby shut down the effect of risk-sharing on prices. I discover and
analyze a positive side of procyclicality: procyclicality mitigates enforcement frictions.
Thus, procyclical assets’ collateral premium in my model contrasts with countercycli-
cal assets’ insurance premium in classical models. This benefit of procyclicality may
account for part of the CAPM’s failure to explain observed returns (Fama and French
(2004)).
Both of the frictions I focus on are of first-order importance for real world firms.
Mironov (2008) documents the importance of flagrant diversion, calculating that Rus-
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sian companies syphoned off upward of ten percent of GDP in both 2003 and 2004.
Moreover, such “looting” is not restricted to developing countries and is indeed common
in the US, as Akerlof and Romer (1993) details. In addition to managers’ explicit theft,
so-called self-dealing, tunnelling, and asset substitution correspond to diversion in my
model—these agency frictions are all well-documented aﬄictions even in countries with
strong legal systems (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny’s 1997 corporate governance sur-
vey). Renegotiation is equally pervasive. For example, Roberts and Sufi (2009) finds
that more than ninety percent of private loans to public firms are renegotiated before
maturity.
The model makes a number of empirical predictions. In the cross-section, it suggests
that firms with procyclical cash flows take on relatively high leverage, consistent with
evidence in Campbell, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2010) and Maia (2010). Aggregating to
study the time-series, I find that entrepreneurs’ leverage is procyclical, which, since all
borrowers in my model exhaust their debt capacity, agrees with Korajczyk and Levy
(2003)’s empirical finding that constrained firms’ debt-equity ratios are procyclical.
Finally, my model speaks to the “essential feature of business cycles” (Basu and Fernald
(2001) p. 225) that productivity is procyclical. In the model, productive entrepreneurs’
debt capacity increases in booms, allowing them to acquire more capital and resulting
in increased aggregate productivity. Further, the model provides several novel empirical
predictions to test. Notably, it suggests that procyclical firms’ investment and leverage
are more sensitive to endowment shocks than are countercyclical firms’ investment and
leverage.
The remainder of the introduction describes the paper’s context in the literature and
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its incremental contribution relative to several papers (subsection 2.1.1). Section 2.2
sets up the formal model and section 2.3 solves it. Section 2.4 describes the four bench-
marks to contextualize the results. Section 2.5 describes the welfare-improving policy
intervention. Section 2.6 states real world analogues of model variables (subsection
2.6.1) and enumerates predictions about the signs of coefficients of linear regressions
from correlations in the model (subsection 2.6.2) and from a natural experiment viewed
as a shock to the model (subsection 2.6.3).
2.1.1 Related Literature
As in Shleifer and Vishny (1992), in my model general equilibrium asset liquidation
values determine debt capacity. In both their model and mine, asset buyers’ funding
constraints and the wedge between the value of the assets in first- and second-best
use, which they term “asset illiquidity”, pin down liquidation values. They assume
that debtors cannot reschedule their loans, so liquidation values do not matter when
borrowers succeed and repay, but only matter when they fail and default, when creditors
seize collateral and sell it to the highest bidder. They model two firms in an industry
with correlated projects; they emphasize that when one is forced to liquidate the other
is likely to be cash-strapped, its financial constraints preventing it from acquiring
its competitor’s old assets, leaving them to be redeployed inefficiently by an industry
outsider. In my model, in contrast, liquidation values are most important when projects
succeed because they determine outsiders’ threat points in renegotiation, while, when
entrepreneurs fail, they have incentives to divert capital, decreasing the quantity of
liquidatable assets. Shleifer and Vishny conclude that, because cyclical assets are
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illiquid in downturns, “cyclical and growth assets are poor candidates for debt finance”
(p. 1359); in my model, the interaction between renegotiation and capital diversion flips
the result.
Hart and Moore (1998) also focuses on the interaction between these frictions. As
in my model, creditors’ right to foreclose on capital is the essential enforcement mech-
anism. In their three-date model, an entrepreneur requires a fixed capital investment
to start a project comprising risky returns and asset liquidation values at the middle
and final dates. The main results say, roughly, that when only the interim payoffs are
risky, optimal debt contracts maximize financial slack, whereas when only the terminal
return is risky, optimal debt contracts constitute entrepreneurs’ “maximum equity par-
ticipation”. Depending on his project’s specific risks, an entrepreneur either borrows
to capacity to maintain a cushion of working capital or puts up all of his own money to
take on as little debt as possible in order to minimize liquidation when the surplus lost
from foreclosure is greatest. They do not analyze the comovement of liquidation and
continuation values, the variable of primary interest for me. More specifically, after
the entrepreneur gets his enterprise off the ground, he renegotiates his debts and scales
up his project at the interim date, when he also potentially diverts cash flows but not
assets in place. Liquidation—tantamount to withdrawal of the entrepreneur’s specific
capital—preempts the project’s bearing fruit at the final date, when the entrepreneur
will never repay anything. I weaken the assumption that assets in place cannot be di-
verted, supposing instead that a market exists where the entrepreneur can liquidate by
himself. In my model the creditor faces a further constraint to repayment: the debtor
diverts unless his project’s terminal cash flows less repayments exceed his revenues from
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diverting capital early. Because projects are scaleable, entrepreneurs always borrow to
capacity—or write the “fastest” debt contract in Hart and Moore’s language—not be-
cause they wish to maintain financial slack, but, rather, because they want to buy
more capital. My innovations with respect to this paper are, firstly, to show that the
comovement between liquidation values and inside returns—procyclicality—is a valu-
able resource for financially constrained entrepreneurs and, secondly, to endogenize
liquidation values in a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) studies price and output fluctuations when a small,
unanticipated technological shock hits the steady state of an infinite-horizon economy
in which entrepreneurs must post assets to secure their loans—capital famously plays
a dual role, it yields output and serves as collateral. The resulting price change is
the same order of magnitude as the productivity change. Because prices represent the
entire future productivity of assets, in the Arrow–Debreu world a momentary change
in productivity leads “the price to experience a tiny blip” (p. 214). But, in Kiyotaki
and Moore’s model, since increased productivity loosens borrowing constraints allowing
further asset purchases which, in turn, increase productivity and loosen borrowing con-
straints (repeat), the interplay between the two functions of capital converts the blip
into a wallop. The feedback loop between slackened budget constraints and increased
borrowing capacity works both within and between periods, effects which Kiyotaki and
Moore refer to as the static and intertemporal multipliers. The collateral multiplier
(section 2.3.4) in my model relies on the same spiralling back-and-forth, but, since the
constrained agents—the entrepreneurs—are short-lived, the long-term consequences of
immediate constraints are absent. But, because my model is stochastic and repay-
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ments depend on both entrepreneurs’ success and the aggregate state tomorrow, the
one-period-ahead effects are subtler; my analysis separates the changes in the price
today from changes in the price tomorrow. Capital demand curves can slope upward
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), because more expensive capital means more valuable
collateral, which comes with increased borrowing capacity, output, and profits. My
overlapping generations set-up renders cumulative wealth unimportant: prices are only
forward-looking—the only state variable is the aggregate state. Demand curves have
the vanilla downward slope in today’s price, but they slope upward in the expected
price when repayment occurs, namely in the event that entrepreneurs succeed tomor-
row. Price changes, not price levels, matter in my model; specifically, the ratio of the
expected price given success to the price today—entrepreneurs’ cyclicality—determines
demand today. Assuming that entrepreneurs live for only two dates allows me to re-
spond to the challenge that Kiyotaki and Moore pose in their concluding remarks,
“The pressing next step in the research is to construct a fully fledged stochastic model,
in which a shock is not a zero probability event and is rationally anticipated” (p. 243),
but my main contribution is to demonstrate that price and output fluctuations result
endogenously from the collateral frictions alone, even absent exogenous variation in
productivity. In my model economic fluctuations arise even when no blip at all shows
up in the Arrow–Debreu archetype.
In a 2003 paper, Krishnamurthy builds a stripped-down version of Kiyotaki and
Moore’s model to analyze the hypothesis that state-contingent hedging contracts pre-
vent the economy from amplifying shocks. He shows that, even if insurers require col-
lateral to force entrepreneurs to repay, permitting hedging kills amplification. When
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limited enforcement is two-sided, however, and entrepreneurs also demand collateral
from insurers to secure their hedges, the supply of collateral fails to stretch far enough
to insure all risk and the amplification mechanism reemerges. Since in my model en-
trepreneurs can divert capital as well as cash flows, the optimal state-contingent con-
tract yields the same transfers as standard debt after renegotiation or capital diversion
(cf. the discussion in section 2.2.6).
Lorenzoni (2008) uses the Krishnamurthy (2003) structure to assess the welfare con-
sequences of leverage. In a three-date model, entrepreneurs first borrow from investors
via state-contingent contracts and then, at the interim date, they receive perfectly cor-
related payoffs and invest in deterministic constant-returns projects. As in my model,
deep-pocketed investors have a decreasing-returns technology; they are marginal since
entrepreneurs are constrained. In both models, entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints
lead to variations in the residual capital supply held by investors—and thus to changes
in the marginal productivity of capital—that drive price fluctuations. In Lorenzoni’s
model, entrepreneurs sell poorly performing assets to pay their creditors. As they liqui-
date more capital, investors hold more, lowering marginal productivity and, therefore,
prices, thereby forcing entrepreneurs to sell more capital to meet their debts. The
more they borrow the more they must promise to repay and the more they must liq-
uidate when returns are low. Because agents are price-takers, they fail to internalize
the negative impact of heavy leverage on prices. The main result is that, because
of this pecuniary externality, the competitive equilibrium is constrained suboptimal:
because highly levered entrepreneurs must liquidate assets to repay their debts at the
middle date, the unproductive investors hold too much capital in expectation. Capping
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borrowing leads to a Pareto improvement. Lorenzoni warns against over-borrowing.
In my model, entrepreneurs do not borrow enough. The inefficiency is more direct:
repayment constraints prevent investors from lending to the agents who use it most
productively and, as in Lorenzoni’s low-return states, the economy never achieves the
first-best allocation. Transferring wealth to productive agents with more balance sheet
capacity, namely to procyclical entrepreneurs, increases welfare because they gear up
to invest more. While my prescription is orthogonal to Lorenzoni’s, it requires the
caveat that price effects like those he focuses on must not be too big: as procyclical
agents receive subsidies they drive up the capital price, reducing their ability to stretch
their endowments and damping the benefits of the transfers (that entrepreneurs’s ini-
tial wealth is not too large suffices for the result to hold at the margin, cf. Proposition
25).
The theoretical framework of general equilibrium with endogenous contracts and
collateral constraints that Geanakoplos built in his 1997 article “Promises, Promises”
has lead him to argue, like Lorenzoni, for the regulation of excessive leverage, citing
increased volatility and severe crashes as features of an economy in which the leverage
cycle is left unmanaged. In their 2004 paper, he and Kubler use the equilibrium concept
to demonstrate that a maturity mismatch can arise endogenously, causing inefficient
liquidation when collateral prices fall. As in Lorenzoni’s model, small borrowers do not
take the collateral price effects into account when they borrow, leading to excessive
leverage which a regulator should cap for a Pareto improvement. The work is most
important for my model in its conceptual underpinnings. Geanakoplos’s definition of a
contract as a promise-collateral pair determined in equilibrium motivates my definition
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of loan contracts (compare with the discussion in section 2.2.6); I also borrow the notion
that some goods function as collateral (my capital) while others do not (my fruit)—
property rights are effectively enforced only over capital goods.
Many models study the role of limited enforcement in dynamic financial contract-
ing or in macroeconomics. Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004) does both. They
use a general equilibrium framework to endogenize entrepreneurs’ outside options from
repudiation in an infinite-horizon model of capital diversion. They show that limited
enforcement amplifies productivity shocks: when new projects are highly productive,
investors must give them strong incentives not to abandon their commitments and
search for new opportunities, loosening incentive constraints and allowing more effi-
cient capital allocation. Like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), they consider steady state
equilibria and simulate their responses to exogenous shocks. Analogously, in my model,
high capital prices increase entrepreneurs’ incentives to abscond, but since they are
short-lived with bang-bang technologies, capital price fluctuations do not determine
equilibrium repudiation—they quit only when their own projects fail—but affect only
renegotiated repayments. Contractual constraints make economies that rely on debt to
allocate capital sensitive to productivity shocks. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Coo-
ley et al. (2004) each demonstrates a channel by which limited enforcement amplifies
shocks, based on constraints to check renegotiation and capital diversion, respectively.
My model shows that the two mechanisms do more when they interact: beyond aggra-




The background structure is the probability space (S, F,P) with the set of states S ={
(ωt)t∈Z ; ωt ∈ {a, b, 0}
}
, the natural filtration F of ωt (viewed as a random process),
and the probability P with P {ωs | Ft} = 1/3 for each Ft ∈ F and any ωs with s > t.
Overlaid is an extensive form game in which the refinement from Ft−1 to Ft is
nature acting at date t, termed “the realization of ωt”. The histories that include the
realization of ωt but not of ωt+1 constitute period t.
“Today” and “tomorrow” refer to Ft - and Ft+1-measurable variables from the point
of view of period t.
2.2.2 Goods, Players, and Technologies
The numeraire is a perishable consumption good called fruit and measured in pounds.
Capital is in supply K and produces fruit according to players’ technologies; it does
not depreciate. pt denotes the price of capital at date t. A player with technology
τ ∈ {α, β, γ} and capital k produces τ(k)(ω) of fruit if ω realizes tomorrow.
A unit continuum of long-lived players called investors have deterministic technol-
ogy τ = γ, where γ ′ > 0, γ ′′ < 0, and γ ′(0) = A. They are deep-pocketed in fruit. At
each date they act to maximize the expected value of future consumption discounted









over feasible consumption profiles {cs}s≥t (given beliefs about other players’ action
profiles).
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Entrepreneurs are short-lived players with risky technologies. At each date a unit
of α-entrepreneurs and a unit of β-entrepreneurs are born, where α-entrepreneurs have
w-pound endowments if ωt = a and nothing otherwise and, likewise, β-entrepreneurs
have w-pound endowments if ωt = b and nothing otherwise. An entrepreneur born at
date t with technology τ is called a t- or τ -entrepreneur, depending on the context; at





3Ak if ωt+1 = a,0 otherwise
and β-entrepreneurs have technology
β(k)(ωt+1) =

3Ak if ωt+1 = 0,0 otherwise.
(See figure 2.1 for a pictorial representation of the entrepreneurs’ technologies.) An
entrepreneur born at date t acts to maximize his expected consumption at t+ 1.
A project is an entrepreneur’s technology given his capital investment. Liquidation
is the extraction of capital from a project before it bears fruit. A project is successful
if τ(k)(ωt+1) 6= 0.
e and i denote typical entrepreneurs and investors; α, β refer to types of en-
trepreneurs. Below, kτt denotes the capital τ -entrepreneurs hold and and k
e
t denotes














Figure 2.1: The heads of the arrows represent the states in which the respective en-
trepreneurs’ technologies pay off. The tails of the arrows represent the states in which
these entrepreneurs have positive endowments. In equilibrium, only entrepreneurs




A contract c = (F, ℓ) is a promise to repay F pounds tomorrow in exchange for ℓ
pounds today. Contracts are bilateral between a creditor and a debtor (but see the
comment in section 2.2.6). The debtor is long the contract and the creditor is short it.
If the debtor fails to repay F , the creditor has the right to seize the debtor’s capital;
seizure destroys the successful project’s fruit. With all contracts comes the risk that
the debtor will divert capital, denoted ζ = d, or, if he does not, ζ = ¬d, the risk that he
will renegotiate to a repayment F ′ < F . Subsection 2.2.4 below describes the timing of
the stage game that players play in each period, including the renegotiation protocol,
which follows Hart and Moore (1998) and ascribes bargaining power to entrepreneurs.
Denote a τ -entrepreneur’s actual repayment at t+ 1 associated with contract c by the
random variable Tt+1(F, k; τ) = T (F, k), for short—viz. the contract c written at date
t induces equilibrium transfer T (F, k)(ωt+1) when ωt+1 realizes at date t+1. The value
of the promise to repay F from a τ -entrepreneur with capital k is Et [T (F, k)]/R to an
investor.
2.2.4 Stage Game
In each period t ∈ Z, first the state realizes, revealing the payoffs of old entrepreneurs.
Then, young entrepreneurs are born, determining the date-t price of capital and thus
the liquidation values of old entrepreneurs’ collateral. Old entrepreneurs either di-
vert and liquidate their projects or wait for them to bear fruit, only to renegotiate
their debts; then they sell their capital in the market before they consume and die.
Meanwhile, young entrepreneurs borrow to fund their projects and buy capital in the
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market, determining the liquidation values for investors and the previous generation of
entrepreneurs.
The following sequence of moves describes the extensive form of the stage game.
1. ωt realizes. t-entrepreneurs are born.
2. Each old entrepreneur e either diverts capital ζ = d or does not ζ = ¬d.
• If ζ = d, e sells his capital kt−1 in the market (viz. he submits an order −kt−1
that returns ptkt−1 when the market clears in round 6 below); he makes no
transfer to his creditor.
3. If ζ = ¬d, e’s project pays off and he offers a repayment F ′ to his creditor.
• If the creditor accepts the offer, ξ = a, or if F ′ ≥ Ft−1, then e makes him
transfer F ′; if the creditor rejects the offer, ξ = ¬a, then the creditor seizes
e’s capital kt−1, to obtain ptkt−1.
4. Each t-entrepreneur an (arbitrary) investor a contract ct = (Ft, ℓt).
• Each investor accepts or rejects the offer.
5. Each young entrepreneur and each investor submits a demand for capital kt(pt)
(subject his budget constraint).
6. The price pt clears the capital market.




The solution concept is Markov equilibrium.




p¯ := E [pt+1] =
pa + pb + p0
3
.
And note that p¯ ≡ Et [pt+1].
2.2.6 Assumptions
The assumption below that investors are relatively impatient ensures that prices are
never so high (cf. Lemma 5) that entrepreneurs prefer to divert capital and liquidate
than to consume the fruit of a successful project tomorrow (Lemma 8).
Assumption 2.2.1.
R > 4/3. (2.1)
The assumption suffices to streamline proofs and ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium
action profile and price system (equations (2.11)-(2.13)) by providing a uniform bound
on prices.
To ensure that entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints bind—that they do not hold
all capital (corollary 14)—assume further that the entrepreneurs’ endowment is small
relative to the supply of capital. Specifically, assume that entrepreneurs’ endowments
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are always less than the present value of the economy’s maximum expected output, i.e.
the expected output obtained if entrepreneurs were to invest all capital.
Assumption 2.2.2.
Rw ≤ AK. (2.2)
Note that since entrepreneurs’ technologies return nil given failure, scrapping un-
successful projects is efficient; no inefficient liquidation will occur in equilibrium. As a
result, nothing is lost in assuming that debt is non-contingent, i.e. that the repayment
promise does not depend on the state, F (ωt) = F for all ωt. Equilibrium transfers
remain unchanged if the aggregate state is contractible and contracts are optimal be-
cause failing entrepreneurs will always divert their capital (cf. Lemma 8). Further,
the assumption that contracts are bilateral serves only to simplify the analysis. A
richer set-up in which entrepreneurs borrow from multiple creditors via covered debt
contracts c = (F, ℓ, k¯), where F is the face value, ℓ is pounds borrowed, and k¯ is the
capital securing the specific loan delivers the same results.
2.2.7 Notations
The outcome of their projects will determine old entrepreneurs’ behaviour. The fol-
lowing definition gives a notation for the state in which projects succeed.
Notation 2. σ(τ) = ωt if the project τ(k) succeeds in state ωt, i.e. σ(α) = a and
σ(β) = 0.
The price of capital given success will determine young entrepreneurs’ borrowing
capacity. Since projects succeed in only one state, the expected capital price given
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∣∣ωt+1 = σ(τ) ] = pσ(τ).
A special notation for this price is convenient.
Notation 3.
P τ := pσ(τ).
This notation facilitates the notion of project cyclicality as the ratio of the value of
capital given success to the value of capital today.





A project is called procyclical if it succeeds when prices are increasing or χ ≥ 1 and
called countercycical if it succeeds when prices are decreasing or χ < 1. In equilib-
rium an increasing bijection will pair prices and expected output, so procyclicality will
coincide with success when expected output increases.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Investors’ Indifference Condition and Price Bounds
An investor i who holds capital kit > 0 at date t must be indifferent between consuming
and buying capital. The condition that γ ′(0) = A ensures the identity holds even in
the corner in which investors hold no capital, kit = 0. Since investors are deep-pocketed











γ(k) + Et [pt+1k]
))
= 0.







+ Et [ pt+1]
R
(2.3)
where kit is the capital held by any investor i at date t.
This expression implies that the price of capital is bounded above by that of a











































The investors’ indifference condition and the restriction to Markov equilibria provide
a lower bound on prices.
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Lemma 6. For any ω ∈ {a, b, 0},
3Rpt > p
ωt . (2.4)
Proof. Immediately from equation (2.3),
3Rpt = 3γ
′(kit) + 3Et [ p
ωt+1 ]
= 3γ′(kit) + p


















Lemma 5 and Assumption 2.2.1 (that R > 4/3) suffice to solve the stage game by
backward induction. First: because the entrepreneur has the bargaining power, he
repays at most his creditor’s seizure value.
Lemma 7. If ζ = ¬d, an entrepreneur with capital k who is long a contract with face
value F repays
T (F, k) = min {F , pt+1k } .
Proof. See appendix 2.8.2 for the standard argument.
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2.3.3 Capital Diversion
A failing entrepreneur may divert capital and liquidate it, obtaining the value of his
assets in place, forgoing his project’s fruit but avoiding paying his debts. A successful
entrepreneur repays as long as his payoff from continued production is sufficiently high
relative to his anticipated repayment. Now, Lemma 8 demonstrates that Assumption
2.2.1 ensures that successful entrepreneurs continue their projects and thus make trans-
fers to their creditors. The result emphasizes the importance of dynamic borrowing
relationships; debtors repay their debts only because they anticipate future cash flows
and must avoid early liquidation.
Lemma 8. A τ -entrepreneur plays ζ = ¬d if and only if ωt = σ(τ).
Proof. The proof is in appendix 2.8.3. Sufficiency follows from noting that if F > 0
an entrepreneur with no cash flow always diverts because otherwise he would forfeit
F . Necessity results from bounding prices relative to cash flows using Lemma 5 and
Assumption 2.2.1.
2.3.4 Collateral Multiplier
When an entrepreneur purchases investment capital, his stock of collateral expands,
thus allowing him to borrow to acquire still more capital. This dual role of capital
creates a multiplier effect whereby an increase in capital leads to a further increase in
capital.
An investor accepts a τ -entrepreneur’s offer to borrow ℓ against the promise to
repay F = ∞ whenever present value of the expected transfer—the probability of
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success times the value of collateral given success divided by the investors’ discount
rate—exceeds the value of the loan or the borrowing constraint




is satisfied, where k is the capital held by the entrepreneur. With fruit w he can buy
w/pt units of capital which he can pledge to borrow P
τw/(3Rpt) pounds, with which he
will buy an additional P τt+1w/(3Rp
2
t ) units of capital, which, in turn, he can pledge to
borrow. The entrepreneur may repeat this buy-pledge-borrow sequence ad infinitum.






























3pt − P τ/R. (2.7)
Proposition 9 below demonstrates that entrepreneurs’ balance sheets stretch by a mul-
tiplier that depends only on their cyclicality; the proof arrives at the same formula as
the series above as a solution of the linear system of binding budget and borrowing
constraints.







Proof. The maximum liability ℓ a τ -entrepreneur can secure with capital k is given by






and the maximum capital an entrepreneur can obtain comes from his binding budget
constraint given this loan,
ptk = w + ℓ. (2.9)


























The constant of proportionality Sχ, called the collateral multiplier, describes the
gross maximum feasible leverage of an entrepreneur with cyclicality χ—his ability to









Figure 2.2 illustrates the maximal balance sheet expansion.
The expression for the maximum size of an entrepreneur’s balance sheet imme-
diately gives an expression for his maximal liability, or debt capacity DCχ, which is
likewise proportional to his endowment by a multiplier which depends on only cycli-














Figure 2.2: Entrepreneurs’ balance sheets expand by up to the collateral multiplier Sχ.




The formula for the collateral multiplier reveals that cyclicality is valuable to en-
trepreneurs, granting them commitment power: the procyclical entrepreneurs can bor-
row more and invest more, as corollary 11 now states.
Corollary 11. The multiplier Sχ and the debt capacity DCχ are increasing in en-
trepreneurs’ cyclicality χ.
Proof. Immediate from differentiation of Sχ and DCχ.
A procyclical borrower can not only borrow more than a countercyclical borrower
initially, but he can also buy more capital with his loan and thus reuse his initial liq-
uidity to lever up even further. Thus, the sensitivity of debt capacity to cyclicality
increases in cyclicality, as stated formally in corollary 12. The observation offers an
insight tangential to the main results: more levered firms are more sensitive to cycli-
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cality χτt = P
τ/pt, and therefore must adjust their balance sheets more in response to
fluctuations in the price pt.
Corollary 12. The multiplier Sχ and the debt capacity DCχ are convex in entrepreneurs’
cyclicality χ.
Proof. Immediate from second differentiation of Sχ and DCχ and the bound χ < 3R
from inequality (2.5).
Now, corollary 13 states the immediate result that, since debt capacity is propor-
tional to equity, penniless entrepreneurs have no way to raise funds.
Corollary 13. Entrepreneurs with endowment zero do not invest, i.e. kβt = 0 if ωt ∈
{a, 0} and kαt = 0 if ωt ∈ {b, 0}.
Finally, the upper bound on entrepreneurs’ ability to borrow combines with As-
sumption 2.2.2 (which says that entrepreneurs’ endowments are not too large) to imply
that entrepreneurs never hold all of the capital, ensuring an interior solution.
Corollary 14. Entrepreneurs never hold all of the capital, ket < K.
Proof. The proof is in appendix 2.8.4. It supposes that entrepreneurs do hold all the
capital in one state and uses the Markov assumption to tighten the lower bound on the
price. It then combines the upper bound on balance sheet size (Proposition 9) with
Assumption 2.2.2 for a contradiction.
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2.3.5 Entrepreneurs Borrow to Capacity
Entrepreneurs will always borrow to capacity. Since they consume only when they
are old, they borrow as much as they can so long as expected repayments are not
prohibitively high relative to capital prices today. To prefer strictly to borrow, en-
trepreneurs must be infra-marginal; that they never hold all of the capital (corollary
14) will suffice.
Any investor to whom an entrepreneur with capital k offers c = (F, ℓ) accepts if
and only if
min {F , P τk }
3R
≥ ℓ,
since the debtor repays only one-third of the time, when he succeeds. Each t-entrepreneur





3Ak −min {F , P τk}
)
subject to
ptk ≤ w + ℓ,
ℓ ≤ min {F , P
τk}
3R
(having omitted the time subscripts and player superscripts on the choice variables).
The expectation in the objective embeds the value of liquidation in the state when the
project succeeds as well as in both states when it fails.
Lemma 15. F ≥ P τk.
Proof. Since his objective is increasing in k, the entrepreneur’s programme reduces to
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3Ak −min {F , P τk}
)
subject to the borrowing constraint




Now suppose (in anticipation of a contradiction) F < P τk. The objective is in-
creasing in k and decreasing in F so the constraint
ptk ≤ w + F
3R






































If the inequality is strict, then the objective is strictly increasing in F so the solution
contradicts the assumption F < P τk.






or γ′(kit) = A, so k
i
t = 0 and k
e
t = K, which contradicts corollary 14.
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ζ = ¬d T = pt+1kt
















Figure 2.3: A reduced-form tree representation of the equilibrium of the stage game
between an entrepreneur and his creditor. The tree incorporates the lemmata 8, 7, and
15. The entrepreneur’s payoffs are above the creditor’s in the payoff profiles.
2.3.6 Prices
Lemma 15 says entrepreneurs always borrow to capacity and equation (2.7) says en-




3pa − P α/R,




3pb − P β/R.
Corollary 13 says that only α entrepreneurs invest in state a and only β entrepreneurs
invest in state b, so if ω ∈ {a, b} then
kit = K − Sτw/pt,
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and if ω = 0 then ket = 0 and k
i
t = K. The equilibrium price system now follows from
equation (2.3), establishing Proposition 16 below.
Proposition 16. In equilibrium, the prices solve
Rpa = p¯+ γ ′
(
K − Sχαt w/pa ), (2.11)
Rpb = p¯+ γ ′
(
K − Sχβt w/pb ), (2.12)
Rp0 = p¯+ γ ′ (K) . (2.13)
Proposition 17. The system (2.11)-(2.13) has a solution (a Markov equilibrium ex-
ists).
Proof. The proof is in appendix 2.8.5. It recasts the system (2.11)-(2.13) as a fixed
point problem in order to apply Brouwer’s theorem after some massaging to ensure the
image is compact despite the singularities in the denominator of Sχ
τ
t .
Analysis of the system in Proposition 16 gives the next main result: when α-
entrepreneurs have positive endowments prices are higher than when β-entrepreneurs
have positive endowments. Procyclicality, not insurance, is the valuable resource in
this economy.
Proposition 18.
p0 < pb < pa.
Proof. The proof is in two steps.
Step 1: Lemma 6 implies immediately that
χτt < 3R
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by γ ′′ < 0.
Step 2: Suppose (in anticipation of a contradiction) that pb ≥ pa so











having subtracted equation (2.11) from equation (2.12). Or, equivalently, by γ ′′ < 0,
K − 3Rw
3Rpb − p0 ≤ K −
3Rw
3Rpa − pa .
Since the denominators are positive by Lemma 6,
3Rpa − pa ≥ 3Rpb − p0.
Rewrite to see that
3R(pa − pb) ≥ pa − p0 > 0,
where the final inequality follows from step 1 and implies that pa > pb, a contradiction.
2.4 Benchmarks
2.4.1 Complete Markets/Perfect Enforcement
Since agents are risk-neutral, with no enforcement problems the most productive agents
hold all of the capital. The marginal return on capital is A in every state, because
investors’ technologies don’t change. Proposition 19 now follows.
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Proposition 19. With perfect enforcement,
pa = pb = p0 =
A
R− 1 .
There is no aggregate price risk in the economy.
2.4.2 No Borrowing
When agents cannot borrow at all, entrepreneurs spend their endowments and only
their endowments on capital. In states a and b their (binding) budget constraints read
pωke, ω = w,
so ke,a = 1/pa, ke,b = 1/pb, and ke,0 = 0. The pricing equation (2.3) implies





Rpb = p¯+ γ ′
(
K − w/pb) , (2.15)
Rp0 = p¯+ γ ′ (K) .
Proposition 20. With no borrowing, pa = pb.
Proof. Suppose (in anticipation of a contradiction) that pa > pb. Subtracting equation







K − w/pb) > 0
and, since γ ′ is decreasing, pb > pa, a contradiction. Thus pb ≤ pa. Repeating the
argument supposing pb > pa gives the result.
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2.4.3 Renegotiation without Capital Diversion









and the budget constraint implies
pωke,ω = w + ℓ = w +
p¯ke,ω
R
if ω ∈ {a, b} and ke,0 = 0. The price system is now












Rp0 = p¯+ γ ′ (K) .
Proposition 21. Without capital diversion, pa = pb.
Proof. The proof is in appendix 2.8.6. It is almost identical to the proof of Proposition
20.
2.4.4 Capital Diversion without Renegotiation
If borrowers divert capital when it is profitable but never renegotiate their debts, they
repay only when they succeed, with repayments capped by incentive constraints, when
they play ζ = ¬d whenever
3Akt + pt+1kt − T ≥ pt+1kt
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or T ≤ 3Akt. The proof of Lemma 15, stating that entrepreneurs assume maximum
leverage, implies here that entrepreneurs set the maximum face value that will induce
repayment, or F = 3Akt. As in the full model, only entrepreneurs with positive en-
dowments can borrow in equilibrium, but the result no longer follows from the formula
(2.10) for entrepreneurs’ debt capacity and requires a separate proof.
Lemma 22. Without renegotiation, entrepreneurs with zero endowment do not borrow.
Proof. The proof is in two steps. Step 1 demonstrates that if t prices are low, en-
trepreneurs are never constrained. Step 2 shows without constraints prices are high, a
contradiction.
Step 1: A τ -entrepreneur with capital k repays nil when he fails and at most 3Ak









If pt ≤ A/R he is unconstrained and if pt > A/R he cannot borrow.
Step 2: Suppose (in anticipation of a contradiction) that pt ≤ A/R. Call the state
ω so pt = p




















Therefore pt < A/R and entrepreneurs without endowments cannot borrow.
The price system without renegotiation follows from entrepreneurs’ borrowing to
capacity: if ω ∈ {a, b} then







and if ω = 0 then ke,0 = 0.












Rp0 = p¯+ γ ′ (K) .
Proposition 23. Without renegotiation, pa = pb.
Proof. The proof is in appendix 2.8.7. It is almost identical to the proofs of Proposition
20 and Proposition 21.
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2.5 Welfare and Policy
2.5.1 Welfare































If a t-entrepreneur is equally likely to be type-α or type-β, increases in output are ex
ante Pareto improvements—all unborn entrepreneurs are better off.
2.5.2 Taxes and Subsidies
Allocating more capital to entrepreneurs increases welfare because it allows the most
productive agents to invest more. Reallocating wealth only among entrepreneurs may
also lead to an ex ante Pareto improvement (in the sense just described in section 2.5.1
above). A social planner who must break even in expectation can levy a tax ε on
























Subscripts now denote values of the transfer ε (and no longer time). A dot above a
variable denotes the rate of change with respect to the tax level, x˙ := dx/dε. The
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shorthands


























The next result, Lemma 24, gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a transfer
from β-entrepreneurs to α-entrepreneurs to increase welfare.


































Applying the quotient rule and rearranging gives the result.
α-entrepreneurs borrow more efficiently than β-entrepreneurs, so transferring a
pound from a β-entrepreneur to an α-entrepreneur increases efficient capital invest-
ment. This direct effect means that so long as the indirect price effects, which in turn
determine changes in balance sheet capacity, are not too large, a social planner in-
deed wishes to transfer wealth to procyclical entrepreneurs in aggregate. A sufficient
condition is that entrepreneurs’ wealth is not too large, as stated in Proposition 25
presently.
Proposition 25. If w is small, a marginal transfer from β-entrepreneurs to α-entrepreneurs
increases welfare, i.e. W˙t(0) > 0.
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making w small ensures the condition is satisfied. Since
γ′(K)
R− 1 ≤ p
ω ≤ A
R− 1 ,
it suffices to show that p˙w0 is finite. Perturbing the price system (2.11)-(2.13) and
























































0) satisfying the bounds (2.5.2) and any w.
2.6 Predictions
2.6.1 Framework and Definitions
This section recasts the model in terms of (theoretically) measurable quantities to state
some testable implications. As emphasized, the interaction between the two kinds of
limited enforcement—the inability to commit not to renegotiate debt and not to divert
capital—effects all of the main results; therefore, the predictions below apply when
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enforcement frictions are very important, for example in developing countries in which
creditor rights are weak and enforcement is costly.




and call its one-step-ahead expectation the expected return,
r¯t := Et [rt+1] .
The “beta” of an entrepreneur’s project τ is its linear projection on to capital returns,
beta τt :=
Covt [rt+1, τ ]
Vart [rt+1]
.
Since the equilibrium is Markov, the conditional variance of returns is constant. Define
Σ := Vart [rt+1]
to write
betaτt :=
Covt [rt+1, τ ]
Σ
and compute the covariance:


















(having made use of the success indicator notation 2). The next lemma summarizes












= Aket + γ(K − ket )
so productivity (normalized by K) is
productivityt := A+ γ
′(K − ket ). (2.21)
Since capital is the only durable asset in the economy and an increasing bijection
maps prices to expected output, use capital prices to proxy for the state of the economy,
market t := Kpt.
Now since pt is high exactly when k
e is high (because γ′ < A), expected output is high
exactly when the market is high. Call date t a “boom” if markett is high.
The asset value or size of an entrepreneur’s enterprise is the sum of his equity
endowment w and the present value of his debt ℓτt ,
sizeτt := w + ℓ
τ
t .






Since debt capacity is increasing in cyclicality and entrepreneurs are always maximally
levered (Lemma 15 and Corollary 11), size and leverage are increasing in beta.
54
Prediction 2.6.2.1. Size is increasing in cyclicality.
In the cross-sectional regression
sizeτt = β beta
τ
t + εt,
the estimate of the coefficient β is positive, βˆ > 0.
Prediction 2.6.2.2. Leverage is increasing in cyclicality.
In the cross-sectional regression
leverage τt = β beta
τ
t + εt,
the estimate of the coefficient β is positive, βˆ > 0.
Booms occur when procyclical agents can borrow, giving the analogous predictions
in the time-series.
Prediction 2.6.2.3. Average size is high in booms.
In the time-series regression
size t = βmarkett + εt,
the estimate of the coefficient β is positive, βˆ > 0.
Prediction 2.6.2.4. Average leverage is high in booms.
In the time-series regression
leverage t = βmarkett + εt,
the estimate of the coefficient β is positive, βˆ > 0.
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The procyclicality of constrained firms’ leverage is well-documented empirically. See,
for example, Korajczyk and Levy (2003).
From the proof of Proposition 18, entrepreneurs hold more capital in a-states than
in b-states and more capital in b-states than in 0-states:
K > K − 3Rw




ke,0 < ke,b < ke,a.
Thus, immediately from the definition (equation (2.21)), productivity is high in booms.
Prediction 2.6.2.5. Productivity is high in booms.
In the time-series regression
productivityt = βmarkett + εt,
the estimate of the coefficient β is positive, βˆ > 0.
This prediction volunteers an explanation of the puzzle of procyclical productivity
originating with Hall (1988). I think the explanation that productivity is higher because
of loosening borrowing constraints improves capital allocation—that resources flow
more efficiently to productive firms in booms than in recessions due to increased debt
capacity—may be new.
2.6.3 A Natural Experiment
Since the collateral multiplier Sχ is increasing in cyclicality (corollary 11), procycli-
cal entrepreneurs’ balance sheets are more sensitive to their endowments than are
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countercyclical entrepreneurs’. A shock to endowments, resulting, for example, from
foreign capital flowing into a newly opened economy, provides a natural experiment for
difference-in-differences analysis of the model’s predictions.
Specifically, suppose that a uniform, unanticipated positive shock to endowments
occurs at date t∗ so that all endowments are w before or at t∗ and are w < w after t∗.
Proposition 9 and Lemma 15 say that
















































w − w ) > 0.
which immediately give the following predictions for the panel regressions of size and
leverage against cyclicality.
Prediction 2.6.3.1. Positive shocks to endowments increase the size of procyclical
firms more than of countercyclical firms.
If a positive shock to capital occurs at time t∗, then in the panel regression












the estimate of the coefficient β is positive, βˆ > 0, for any beta∗.
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Prediction 2.6.3.2. Positive shocks to endowments increase the leverage of procyclical
firms more than of countercyclical firms.
If a positive shock to capital occurs at time t∗, then in the panel regression
leverage τt = α+ β1
{










the estimate of the coefficient β is positive, βˆ > 0, for any beta∗.
2.7 Conclusions
The contractual frictions of capital diversion and renegotiation interact so as to make
procyclicality a valuable resource for entrepreneurs—it increases their power to commit
to repay loans and therefore allows them to lever up. Borrowers’ inability to commit
not to renegotiate loans makes collateral valuable to creditors even when their debtors
are not near bankruptcy, because it determines creditors’ seizure value during renego-
tiation. Borrowers’ incentive to divert capital in anticipation of default—to line their
own pockets and avoid handing over good quality assets to their creditors—decreases
the quantity and quality of assets that creditors can liquidate when they repossess a
firm. The threats of renegotiation and capital diversion interact. They make collat-
eral relatively more valuable to creditors when debtors’ projects succeed than when
they fail. Creditors, therefore, value the comovement between liquidation values and
borrower success: debtor procyclicality is a valuable resource for creditors because it
allows them to enforce repayment. Since creditors can enforce repayment of loans to
procyclical borrowers most effectively ex post, they are willing to lend to them ex ante.
Thus procyclicality is a valuable resource for borrowers: it grants them the power to
commit and allows them to lever up.
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The main new insight is that output procyclicality can loosen borrowing constraints.
Further, the mechanism does not affect only individual firms, but has implications
for the aggregate economy. When productive agents are procyclical, they are uncon-
strained and can borrow to buy capital, thereby effecting efficient capital allocation.
Capital prices increase to reflect the productivity of capital in its best use. In contrast,
when the productive agents are countercyclical, their ability to borrow is limited and
they cannot acquire the capital that they require to produce. Hence, capital remains
poorly allocated and, since the marginal buyer may be relatively unproductive, capital
prices are low. This mechanism questions the literature’s conclusion that procyclical
assets necessarily trade at a discount since they add market risk to investors’ portfolios.
Procyclical assets can also mitigate enforcement frictions leading them to demand a
collateral premium.
Financing frictions matter for the macroeconomy not only because they determine
the allocation and price of capital but also because they generate endogenous fluctua-
tions in productivity and expected output. When the two frictions of capital diversion
and renegotiation are both present in the economy, capital prices and expected output
fluctuate even when they do not in the benchmark economies with one or both of the
fractions removed. Thus the interaction between capital diversion and renegotiation
creates an endogenous component of the business cycle.
In accordance with many papers in the literature (e.g., Lorenzoni (2008), Stein
(2012)), my welfare analysis suggests that policy makers must take firms’ financing
constraints into account. But, in contrast to these models, in my model leverage is
inefficiently low because entrepreneurs’ endogenous private borrowing limits stifle effi-
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cient capital allocation. To increase aggregate efficiency, the government must provide
liquidity to firms that make the best use of their capital as collateral—those firms that
can stretch their endowments and lever up. When contractual enforcement is limited by
capital diversion and renegotiation, the government should subsidize procyclical firms.
Since limits to lending result from borrowers’ inability to commit to repay, subsidizing
private lenders—injecting capital into the banking sector—may not increase lending or
aid capital allocation. Direct subsidies to procyclical entrepreneurs are necessary.
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2.8 Appendices
2.8.1 Proof of Lemma 5







































2.8.2 Proof of Lemma 7
An entrepreneur never plays F ′ > F because F ′ = F induces the same action (ξ = a)
and gives him a higher payoff. Suppose F ′ < F .
If F ′ < pt+1k the creditor plays ξ = ¬a, leaving the entrepreneur with nil, so
F ′ ≥ pt+1k. If F ′ > pt+1k then ξ = a, but F ′′ = (F ′ + pt+1k)/2 is superior for the
debtor and ξ = a still, so F ′ ≤ pt+1k. Thus if F ′ < F then F ′ = pt+1k and F ′ = F
otherwise, which is to say F ′ = min {F , ptk}.
2.8.3 Proof of Lemma 8
If ωt+1 6= σ(τ), then ζ = ¬d yields pt+1kt − min {F , pt+1kt} and ζ = d yields pt+1kt,
but
pt+1kt −min {F , pt+1kt} ≥ pt+1kt
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only if F ≤ 0 (which, due to Lemma 7 above, implies he would have no debt), so a
failing entrepreneur always plays ζ = d.
If ωt+1 = σ(τ), ζ = ¬d yields 3Akt + pt+1kt − min {F , pt+1kt} and ζ = d yields
pt+1kt; rearranging implies the entrepreneur does not abscond so long as
min {F , pt+1kt} < 3Akt
which holds since








where the last inequality follows from Assumption 2.2.1.
2.8.4 Proof of Lemma 14
Suppose (in anticipation of a contradiction) that at ω ∈ {a, b, 0} ket = K and conse-




































Combine this inequality with equation (2.7) above to compute:
ket ≤
3Rw
3Rpω − P τ
=
3Rw
3(A+ p¯)− P τ
=
3Rw
3A+ pa + pb + p0 − P τ
≤ 3Rw








by Assumption 2.2.2, contradicting ket = K.
2.8.5 Proof of Lemma 17
The proof recasts solutions of system (2.11)-(2.13) as fixed points of a continuous
mapping from a closed ball to itself and applies Brouwer’s theorem.
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For simplicity, employ the convention that a real number divided by zero is infinity
and that a real number minus infinity is minus infinity—x/0 =∞ and x−∞ = −∞.





γ ′(0) if k < 0,
γ ′(k) if k ∈ [0, K],
γ ′(K) if k > K.
γ¯′ inherits monotonicity from γ.




) ∈ R3 ∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ pω ≤ AR− 1 , pω ≤ 3Rpω′ for all ω, ω′
}































Away from the singular points of the argument of γ¯ ′, continuity of Γ is immediate. In
their neighbourhoods, namely as pa ց 0 or p0 ր 3Rpb, γ¯ ′ is flat since the argument is
negative, γ¯ ′ ≡ γ ′(0), giving continuity.
Now observe that Γ(Ω) ⊂ Ω because γ¯ ′ is decreasing. Since γ¯ ′ ≤ A and
p¯ ≤ max{pa, pb, pc} ≤ A
R− 1 ,
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for any ω ∈ {a, b, 0},


















or 0 ≤ pω ≤ A/(R− 1). Finally, since γ¯ ′ > 0,
3Rpω ≥ pa + pb + p0 ≥ max{pa, pb, p0} ,
thus 3Rpω ≥ pω′ for any ω and ω′ and Γ : Ω → Ω. Γ has a fixed point by Bouwer’s
theorem. The point solves (2.11)–(2.13)—in which γ ′ replaces γ¯ ′—so long as γ is well-
defined there, namely if entrepreneurs’ capital is indeed nonnegative and not greater
than the total supply. Positivity is immediate from Sχ ≥ 0 and corollary 14 (the proof
of which depends only on the bounds on γ ′, which coincide with those on γ¯ ′) implies
ke < K. A fixed point exists.
2.8.6 Proof of Proposition 21













and, since γ ′ is decreasing,
Rw




or pb > pa, a contradiction. Thus pb ≤ pa. Repeating the argument supposing pb > pa
gives the result.
2.8.7 Proof of Proposition 23






















The Downside of Public
Information in Contracting
3.1 Introduction
Expert delegated asset managers invest on behalf of inexpert clients. They offer con-
tracts to their clients which often make reference to credit ratings.1 But why do they
propose compensation schemes that depend on public information, such as credit rat-
ings, even though clients employ them for their private information? The contracting
literature suggests that contracting on a public signal can mitigate the incentive prob-
lem between a principal and his agent (Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1987), Cremer and
McLean (1988), Riordan and Sappington (1988)). Do references to credit ratings mit-
igate delegated asset managers’ incentive to shift risk?
We propose a model of delegated investment with a public signal that suggests
(i) that contracts do not have to refer to the public signal in order to overcome the
1According to the Bank for International Settlements (2003), “it is common, for example, for
fixed income investment mandates to restrict the manager’s investment choices to investment grade
credits”; that is to say that they restrict their portfolios to securities rated BBB- or higher by Standard
& Poor’s or Baa3 or higher by Moody’s.
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incentive problem; (ii) that contracts include references to the public signal not to
address the incentive problem, but rather to help agents compete; and, in contrast to
the contracting literature, (iii) that decreasing the precision of the public signal leads
to Pareto improvements.
A clear regulatory prescription follows from this last result: broaden ratings cat-
egories, i.e. coarsen the contractible public information partition. Our suggestion is
consistent with regulators’ assertions that institutions should quit responding robot-
ically to ratings. For example, in 2010 the Financial Stability Board told the G20
Finance Ministers that
Investment managers and institutional investors must not mechanistically
rely on CRA ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of assets. This princi-
ple applies across the full range of investment managers and of institutional
investors, including money market funds, pension funds, collective invest-
ment schemes (such as mutual funds and investment companies), insurance
companies and securities firms... [Investment managers should limit] the
proportion of a portfolio that is CRA ratings-reliant.
We build a model with two key frictions: first, agents have private information
and, second, the principal and the agents differ in their attitudes toward risk. The
agents’ private information creates the motive for delegation and the difference in risk
attitudes creates the misalignment of incentives. Both the principal and the agents are
risk averse, but we make no assumption as to who is more risk averse. Further, the
difference between the risk aversion coefficients of the principal and the agent can be
arbitrarily large. However, we require that the utility functions of the principal and the
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agents are in the same class of hyperbolic absolute risk-aversion—i.e. that the absolute
risk tolerance of the agent is an affine transformation of the absolute risk tolerance of
the principal.
The timing of the model is as follows: first, identical agents offer contracts compet-
itively. Each agent’s contract can depend on the final wealth, the agent’s action and
the realization of the public signal, but not on the agent’s private information. The
agents offer the contracts before the realization of the public signal and before they
learn their private information. Second, the public signal realizes and the principal
decides which agent to employ to invest on his behalf. Third, the agent learns his
private information and takes an action. The agent’s private information pertains to
the conditional distribution of final wealth given each of his possible actions. Finally,
wealth realizes and the principal and agent divide it according to the initial contract.
The first result is that the contract that depends on final wealth alone both solves
the incentive problem and implements efficient risk sharing. The reason is that the
contract that implements efficient risk sharing makes the principal and agent equally
sensitive to the final payoff; since the only incentive problem comes from the difference
in risk aversion, this optimal sharing rule aligns the agent’s incentives with the prin-
cipal’s. Therefore the principal can delegate the decision to the agent knowing that
the agent will act in their joint interest given the contract is the efficient sharing rule.
Put differently, the first-best action is incentive compatible, thus there is no need to
introduce the public signal into the contract. Note that this intuition is robust only if
the principal’s and agent’s preferences belong to the same HARA class.2
2To understand why this intuition is not correct for other preferences, see Pratt (2000).
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The second result is that the equilibrium contract does indeed depend on the public
signal even though it does not mitigate the incentive the problem. To see why this
is the case, suppose an equilibrium in which all agents offer contracts that do not
depend on the public signal and observe that an agent has a profitable deviation.
Because agents are competitive, in any equilibrium in which contracts do not depend
on the public signal, agents must break even in expectation across all realizations of the
public signal. Thus, for realizations of the public signal for which the surplus is high,
the employed agent receives more than his reservation utility. But now a competing
agent can undercut him in this high surplus state by offering a contract contingent on
the public signal. Extending this argument implies that agents must break even not
only in expectation, but also for every realization of the public signal. They achieve
this by writing the public signal into their contracts.
The third main result is that decreasing the precision of the public signal is Pareto
improving. Since, by the last result above, agents receive the same payoff (their reser-
vation utility) for each realization of the public signal, they do not bear any risk over
the realization of the public signal. Therefore, the principal bears all the risk associ-
ated with the public signal. That is to say that the agent’s competition prevents them
from providing insurance to the principal. But, decreasing the precision of the public
signal attenuates the negative welfare effects that result from the failure of insurance.
To see the advantage of a less precise public signal more clearly, consider the extreme
case of a fully uninformative public signal. This is equivalent to the case of contracting
without a public signal. In this case, by the first result above, the optimal contract
implements both efficient risk sharing and solves the incentive problem. Therefore, the
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only effect of decreasing the precision of the public signal is to improve the insurance
that the agent provides to the principal: decreasing the precision of the public signal
makes everyone better-off.
Our model provides some useful insight into the role of credit ratings in the dele-
gated asset management industry. One of the most important functions of ratings is
their role in institutional asset management contracts. We apply our framework to a
specific model of delegated portfolio choice, interpreting the public signal as the credit
rating of a risky security. We make the model concrete by considering a two-asset
world with a riskless bond and a risky security. The agent’s private information is his
knowledge of the distribution of the return of the risky security and his action is the
allocation of the principal’s wealth to the risky security. For this part of the paper
we restrict attention to the case in which both the principal and agent have quadratic
utility (but still differ in their aversion to risk). In this setting we can solve not only
for the optimal contract but also for the equilibrium action/portfolio weight in closed-
form. This allows us to establish the main results via explicit calculation. In particular,
to show that decreasing the precision of the credit rating improves welfare, we write
down the players’ indirect utilities explicitly and compare them across different ratings
partitions. Our application is more than an illustration of our theoretical analysis. It
comes with a strong policy prescription: broaden ratings categories to improve risk
sharing. Broadening ratings categories allows portfolio managers to provide insurance
as well as expertise to their clients.
This example also allows us to demonstrate that at least two predictions of our
model are consistent with stylized facts. First, the equilibrium contract is affine in
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wealth, as are most real-wold asset managers’ contracts. Second, the equilibrium con-
tract is higher powered in the event that ratings are good, which we interpret as an
economic boom. The prediction is consistent with empirical evidence on fund flows:
capital flows from money market funds to equity funds—i.e. from funds with low-
powered composition to funds with high-powered compensation—as economic condi-
tions improve (see, for example, Chalmers, Kaul and Blake (2010)).
Our result that improved public information decreases welfare is reminiscent of
Hirshleifer (1971). He argued that more private information could inhibit trading to
share risk in a market setting. For us, simply the ability to contract on information
to be revealed later inhibits risk sharing. Further, in our model the public signal not
only inhibits risk sharing but also is unnecessary to mitigate the incentive problem
between the principal and agent. Several papers have found that public signals are
unambiguously welfare-improving in principal-agent settings with adverse selection,
notably Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1987), Cremer and McLean (1988), Riordan and
Sappington (1988). In these papers the public signal is verifiable ex post. They rely
on large punishments to implement the agent’s truth-telling. Kessler, Lu¨lfesmann and
Schmitz (2005) question these findings by including limited liability with endogenous
punishments; they find that public information can decrease efficiency in some cases.
We alter the set-up in a different way—in our model players are risk-averse and public
information is verifiable ex interim rather than ex post—and we find that better public
information is always welfare-decreasing. In addition to the literature on contracting
in the presence of a public signal, our paper relates to the literature on socially optimal
group decision making (Amershi and Stoeckenius (1983), Pratt and Zeckhauser (1989),
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Pratt (2000), Wilson (1968)). This work typically does not study strategic behaviour.
One exception is Wilson (1984), which studies a social planner who must induce agents
to reveal private information. Our application to asset management is related to the
literature on delegated portfolio choice (Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985), Dybvig,
Farnsworth and Carpenter (2010), Palomino and Prat (2003), Stoughton (1993)). None
of these papers considers the role of public information, but Admati and Pfleiderer
(1997) and He and Xiong (2013) do. Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) studies the role
of performance benchmarks in a classical delegated investment setting and He and
Xiong (2013) studies the role of penalties based on publicly observed market quantities
(mainly based on tracking error) when the agent is a portfolio manager and the principal
is a fund family. There is also an active theory literature studying credit rating agencies
(Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012), Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2010), Donaldson and
Piacentino (2012), Kurlat and Veldkamp (2011), Manso (2014), Mathis, McAndrews
and Rochet (2009), Skreta and Veldkamp (2009)). Unlike these papers, we take ratings
as exogenous and study the affect of their precision on private contracts.
3.2 Model
The model constitutes an extensive game of incomplete information in which agents
first compete in contracts in the hope of being employed by a single investor and then
invest his capital on his behalf.
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Players
There is a single principal with a unit wealth and von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
uP and at least two competitive agents with von Neumann–Morgenstern utility uA and
outside option u¯. The principal and the agents differ in their risk aversion. We make
no assumption as to whether the principal or the agent is more risk averse, but, for the
proof of our main result, we require that both utility functions are in the same class of
hyperbolic absolute risk-aversion. Specifically, their absolute risk tolerances are affine











= aA + bw (3.2)
for ai > −bw for all w and for i ∈ {P,A}.3 Note that this assumption imposes no
restriction on the magnitude of the difference between the principal’s and agent’s risk
aversions. When we consider the application to delegated asset management (Section
3.4) we assume that players have quadratic utility; quadratic utility satisfies conditions
(3.1) and (3.2) with b = −1.
Agents have private information, captured by their type σ. A public signal ρ conveys
information about σ. In the application to delegated asset management, σ represents
agents’ expert knowledge about the risk of the market securities and ρ represents the
securities’ credit ratings.
3For example, when b = 0 conditions (3.1) and (3.2) imply that the principal and the agents have







The principal wishes to delegate investment to an agent because he is better informed;
however, he anticipates a misalignment of investment incentives since his risk aversion
differs from the agents’.
Contracts attempt to align incentives to mitigate the downside of delegated asset
management. Each agent a offers contract Φa which may depend on the final wealth
w, the public signal ρ, and his action x. The agent chooses x after he has entered the
contract. The action choice affects only the distribution of the final wealth w˜(x). We
assume that w˜ is a concave function of x for every state of the world. In our portfolio
management application in Section 3.4, we interpret x as the proportion of wealth
invested in an asset. Note that the agent’s type σ does not enter the contract because
it is not verifiable; however, ρ may enter the contract as a proxy.
Timing
After agents announce their contracts, the principal observes ρ and employs an agent
who chooses x after learning σ. Then, wealth realizes and players divide it according
to the initial contract. Formally, the timing is as follows:
1. Agents simultaneously offer contracts Φa.
2. σ and ρ realize.
3. The principal observes ρ and the profile of contracts {Φa}a and hires an agent
a∗.
4. Agent a∗ chooses x.
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5. Final wealth realizes and it is distributed such that agent a∗ is awarded Φa∗(w)
and the investor keeps w − Φa∗(w).
Note that key to our timing is that players learn ρ after agents offer contracts
but before the principal employes an agent. In Section 3.4.2, we demonstrate that
our results are robust to the inclusion of a second public signal that realizes after the
agent has been employed. Nevertheless, the timing is sensitive to the agent’s offering
contracts before they learn σ. Our timing shuts down any signaling incentives.
Note on Notation
We frequently omit the arguments of variables. The contract Φ always depends on
wealth w, the agent’s action x, and the public signal ρ, as well as the offering agent a,
but we frequently write just Φ(w). The agent chooses the action given his type σ, but
we usually write just x for x(σ). Later we will introduce a social planner’s problem,
in which the welfare function places weight µρ on the agent given the realization ρ of
the public signal. We sometimes suppress this dependence and write µ for µρ. Finally,
the social planner’s sharing rule ϕ depends on final wealth directly and on the public
signal indirectly via the welfare weight. While we sometimes write formally ϕµρ(w),
we frequently abbreviate to ϕµ(w) or even just ϕ(w).
3.3 Results
Competition Is Rating-by-Rating
We first show that agents must break even for every realization of the public signal.
This will allow us to transform our game into a family of principal-agent problems, one
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for each realization of the public signal. That is to say that for every realization of the
public signal the agent must offer the contract that maximizes the principal’s utility
and assures him at least his reservation payoff.









)) ∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ] = u¯
for all ρ.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix 3.6.1.
That agents receive their reservation utility in equilibrium is unsurprising because
they are competitive. The takeaway from Lemma 27 above is that agents receive
their reservation utility for every realization of the public signal. There cannot be an
equilibrium in which agents break even in expectation over all possible realizations
(unless they break even for every realization). In fact, if that is the case, then an agent
who receives less than his reservation utility for some realization of the public signal
must receive in excess of his reservation utility for another realization. But since the
agent is getting strictly in excess of his reservation utility for this realization, another
agent can undercut him by offering a contract that grants him more than his reservation
utility and allocates more of the surplus to the principal.
The proof is by contraction. It is standard except for one subtlety. We first suppose
that an agent receives strictly in excess of his reservation utility for some realization
of the signal. This agent must therefore be employed given this realization. But
then another agent, otherwise unemployed and receiving his reservation utility, would
undercut the employed agent for this realization of the signal. Therefore, a` la Bertrand
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competition, the agents must break-even given this realization. The only subtlety of
the proof is that agents’ contracts affect their incentives and hence their actions. Thus,
when a deviant agent offers the principal a contract, the principal must take the effect
of this contract on the agent’s action into account. Our proof circumvents this issue by
constructing a deviation that preserves the incentives of the originally employed agent
while allocating more surplus to the principal. Specifically, if the supposed equilibrium






preserves the employed agent’s
incentives and allocates more of the surplus to the principal.
The argument in the proof of Lemma 27 also implies that the contract must max-
imize the principal’s utility for every realization of the signal ρ as is summarized in
Corollary 28 below. The reason is that if the employed agent does not maximize the
principal’s utility, then another agent can deviate to a contract more favorable to the
principal that also leaves him a small surplus above u¯.
Corollary 28. If Φa∗ is the contract of the employed agent a
∗ given rating ρˆ and there





w˜ − Φˆ(w˜)) ∣∣ ρ˜ = ρˆ] > E [uP(w˜ − Φa∗(w˜)) ∣∣ ρ˜ = ρˆ] ,








)) ∣∣ ρ˜ = ρˆ] < u¯.
Principal-Agent Formulation
Lemma 27 and Corollary 28 taken together say that the principal chooses the contract
that maximizes his expected utility subject to the constraint that the agent receives
his reservation utility for every realization of the signal ρ. That is to say that the
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equilibrium contract solves the principal-agent problem for every ρ. The twist on a
standard principal-agent problem is that the agent’s participation constraint depends
on the public signal.
Proposition 29. For each realization ρ of the public signal, the contract of the em-















)) ∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ] = u¯ and
x ∈ argmax{E [uA(Φ(w˜(ξ), ξ, ρ) ∣∣ σ˜ = σ] ; ξ ∈ R}
(3.3)
over contract Φ.
Equilibrium Contract as the Solution of a Social Planner’s Problem
For each realization of the public signal ρ, we transform the principal-agent problem
into a social planner’s problem. The social planner will maximize social welfare subject
to the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint. Call the agent’s welfare weight µρ
for a given ρ. This will coincide with the Lagrange multiplier on the agent’s partici-
pation constraint in the principal-agent problem for a given ρ. This approach allows
us eliminate the agent’s participation constraints temporarily to focus on incentive
compatibility.
Now use the method of Lagrange multipliers to eliminate the participation con-





w˜(x)− Φ(w˜(x), x, ρ))+ µρ[uA(Φ(w˜(x), x, ρ)− u¯]













) ∣∣∣ σ˜ = σ] ; ξ ∈ R}
over contract Φ.
For any Lagrange multiplier µρ the problem is equivalent to the social planner’s
problem with welfare weight µρ associated with the agent. That is to say that, for
given µρ, we can omit the agent’s outside option u¯ and solve the following social






w˜(x)− Φ(w˜(x), x, ρ))+ µρuA(Φ(w˜(x), x, ρ)
∣∣∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ
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) ∣∣∣ σ˜ = σ] ; ξ ∈ R} .
(3.4)
Below we solve the problem for a generic Lagrange multiplier and only later we use
the agent’s binding participation constraint to solve for µρ for each ρ. Transforming
the game into a social planner’s problem reveals that the task is to trade off efficient
risk sharing with implementing efficient investment.
The Efficient Sharing Rule Implements Efficient Investment
We now find the contract that solves the social planner’s problem. We do this by
characterizing the first-best contract and action—i.e. those that the social planner
would choose if he had perfect information. We then show that given the first-best
contract the first-best action is incentive compatible, so the solution to the social
planner’s problem coincides with the first-best outcome. Thus, in fact, there is no
tension between risk sharing and efficient investment in equilibrium.
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Proposition 30. If the contract is the efficient sharing rule, then the incentive com-
patible action is the social optimum.
Namely, if ϕ maximizes



















w˜(ξ)− ϕ(w˜(ξ)))+ µρuA(ϕ(w˜(ξ))) ∣∣∣ σ˜ = σ]} .
Proof. The proof is in Appendix 3.6.2.
The main takeaway of Proposition 30 is that for any ρ the efficient contract imple-
ments the efficient action.
In the proof we first find the efficient ϕ. We then demonstrate that, given this ϕ,
the agent would choose the social optimum. That is to say that the action that the
agent chooses coincides with the action a social planner would choose if he had the
agent’s private information.
To understand the connection between incentive alignment and risk sharing, recall
that a sharing rule ϕ is efficient if it maximizes uP(w−ϕ)+µρuA(ϕ) for each realization
of w or
u′P(w − ϕ(w)) = µρu′A(ϕ(w)). (3.5)
On the other hand, the sharing rule ϕ aligns the incentives of the principal and the
agent globally if one’s utility function is an affine transformation of the other’s given
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the sharing rule ϕ, or
uP(w − ϕ(w)) = αuA(ϕ(w)) + β
for some α > 0 and β ∈ R. Differentiating this condition with respect to w gives





This last condition coincides with the condition above of efficient risk sharing (condition
(3.5)) exactly when µρ =
αϕ′(w)
1− ϕ′(w), which is possible if and only if ϕ
′ is a constant
or ϕ is affine. The only remaining step in the argument is to show that the efficient
sharing rule is affine for the preferences we consider, which we show in Lemma 33 in
Appendix 3.6.2.
Coarser Public Signals Are Pareto-Improving
Proposition 30 shows that the optimal contract eliminates the incentive problem for
every σ and the risk sharing problem for every ρ. The problem remains to share risk
over realizations of the public signal. The next result states that less precise public
signals Pareto dominate more precise public signals. The reason is that the public
signal does not mitigate the incentive problem but only hinders risk sharing.
From now on, since the optimal contract solves the incentive problem, we omit
incentive constraints and focus directly on the social planner’s problem (with complete
information) as per Proposition 30.
Proposition 31. Coarser public signals Pareto-dominate finer ones: for any signal ρ˜c
and ρ˜f such that σ(ρ˜c) ⊂ σ(ρ˜f ), the ex ante equilibrium utility of all players is weakly
higher given ρ˜c than ρ˜f .
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Proof. Below we omit the dependence of ϕ on x because by Proposition 30 the efficient
x is chosen for every σ independently of ρ. Below call ϕµρf and ϕµρc the efficient sharing
rules associated with fine and coarse public signals respectively.






) ∣∣∣ ρ˜f] = u¯.







) ∣∣∣ ρ˜c] = E [E [uA (ϕµρf (w˜)
) ∣∣∣ ρ˜f] ∣∣∣ ρ˜c] = E [u¯ ∣∣∣ ρ˜c] = u¯.
This says that ϕµρf satisfies the participation constraint given ρc. Since ϕµρc solves the






w˜ − ϕµρc (w˜)
) ∣∣∣ ρ˜c] ≥ E [uP(w˜ − ϕµρf (w˜)
) ∣∣∣ ρ˜c] .
Now we use the inequality above and we apply the law of iterated expectations again





















w˜ − ϕµρf (w˜)
) ∣∣∣ ρ˜c]] = E [uP(w˜ − ϕµρf (w˜)
)]
.
Since agents always break-even and the principal is better off with coarser public signals
ρ˜c Pareto dominates ρ˜f .
The main step of the proof is to show that a contract that is feasible given a fine
signal structure is also feasible given a coarse signal structure. This follows directly
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from the law of iterated expectations. Since coarsening the signal structure expands
the set of feasible contracts, it can only increase the principal’s objective (recall that
the incentive constraints are not binding by Proposition 30). Since the agent always
breaks even, increasing the principal’s profits constitutes a Pareto improvement.
The intuition behind this result comes from Lemma 27. Because competition makes
agents break even state-by-state, there is one participation constraint for each realiza-
tion of the public signal. Thus, with a finer signal structure there are more realizations
of the public signal and, thus, more constraints on the principal’s objective. Because
we know from Proposition 30 that the efficient action is always taken, these constraints
restrict only risk sharing between the principal and the agent. A finer signal structure
shuts down risk sharing and reduces welfare.
3.4 An Example: Portfolio Choice with Quadratic
Utility
Setup
To fix ideas we consider the specific case of portfolio choice with quadratic utility. This
example allows us to solve the model explicitly and thus it exposes the forces behind
the more general proofs above.
The portfolio choice model has a risk-free bond with gross return Rf and a risky
asset with random gross return R˜ . The agent’s type σ will be the standard deviation
of R˜ and ρ will be an imperfect public signal about this risk parameter. Call ρ the
credit rating of the risky security. The agent’s action x represents the proportion of
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wealth invested in the risky security; therefore,











for i ∈ {A,P}. The investor differs from the agents in his risk aversion. Note that the
coefficient of absolute risk tolerance is ai−w, so these utility functions are in the same
class of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion as defined in equations (3.1) and (3.2).
We make some restrictions on the distribution of R˜ to simplify the belief updating.
We assume that the mean return R¯ of the risky asset is known and independent of the
agent’s type σ. In fact, since with quadratic utility players’ expected utility depends
on only the mean and variance of the distribution, all relevant asymmetric information
is about the variance σ2. Note that this assumption implies that the credit rating is




∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ] = E[R˜ ].
With quadratic utility, players’ marginal utility is decreasing when their wealth
is large. We restrict parameters to ensure that players’ wealth is not so large. In
particular, it must be that the wealth of the principal and that of the agent are not
too large, or, respectively,




A sufficient condition for this is
supp w˜ ⊂ [0, aP + aA). (3.6)




R− R¯) ≤ σ2 (3.7)
for all pairs (σ,R).4
3.4.1 Results
Competition Is Rating-by-Rating
Lemma 27 implies that agents must break even for each realization of the credit rating.
Recall that the reason is that competition in contracts is Bertrand-like in the sense that
the employed agent will receive his reservation utility conditional on any realization of
the credit rating ρ˜; further agents act so as to maximize the investor’s expected utility
conditional on every ρ subject to their participation constraints.
The proof of Lemma 27 is in Appendix 3.6.1, but re-iterating the main argument
with these specific utility functions can clarify the proof. Recall that the proof is by
contradiction. Supposing an equilibrium in which an agent receives in excess of his
reservation utility for some realization of the public signal, a deviating agent can un-
dercut him. However, we must be careful to take into account the effect of the new
contract on the agent’s incentives. We construct a deviation that does not distort in-
centives. With the current utility specification we can write it explicitly. In particular,
4Condition (3.7), sufficient for condition (3.6), comes from solving the game assuming that the
agent’s participation constraint binds, then writing a sufficient condition for it to bind in light of the
equilibrium.
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)− ε)) = aA −√(aA − Φˆ(w))2 − 2ε
gives the agent identical incentives to Φ and allocates more surplus to the principal.
Principal-Agent Formulation and Social Planner’s Problem
Lemma 27 asserts that agents compete rating-by-rating, maximizing investor welfare
subject to their participation constraints, that is to say that, for every realization ρ
of the credit rating, the contract of the employed agent and the corresponding port-
folio weight solve the principal-agent problem of Proposition 29. Using the method
of Lagrange multipliers we can transform the principal-agent problem into the social
planner’s problem summarized by the system (3.4). Now, unlike in the general case,
we can compute simple expressions not only for the optimal contract but also for the
agent’s action x and the Lagrange multiplier/welfare weight µρ.
The Efficient Sharing Rule Implements Efficient Investment










or, for quadratic utility,




for all w. Thus the efficient sharing rule is
ϕµ(w) = aA +




Observe that the standard deviation σ does not enter the expression, and thus that
the social planner need not know the true variance to implement optimal risk sharing.
Given the optimal sharing rule, we now calculate the first-best investment in the
risky security x∗ in the sense that x∗ is the investment that the social planner would
make if he knew the standard deviation σ. The first-best will be useful in finding the
solution to the second-best problem in which the social planner knows only ρ and the
agent chooses x. This x in turn constitutes the equilibrium allocation of the model.
The reason that it is useful to compute the first-best outcome is that we proceed to
show that it is an attainable outcome of the second-best problem. Thus we solve the
game by showing that the social optimum is attainable.








)− ϕµ(Rf + x(R˜ −Rf))



























Note that the optimal investment does not depend on the welfare weight µ, thus the
social planner chooses the same x∗ for all µ, even as µ → ∞. But, now, in the limit
as µ → ∞, since in this case the social planner puts all the weight on the agent, his
objective coincides with the agent’s. Put differently, if the contract is the efficient
sharing rule, the agent always takes the socially optimal action. This observation
implies Proposition 30 in the context of this example.
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The Break-even Welfare Weight and Ex Ante Utility
Now we can characterize the employed agent’s contract explicitly by finding the La-
grange multiplier µρ for each ρ. For a given contract ϕµρ the agent must break even,










))) ∣∣∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ
]
= u¯. (3.11)
This equation combined with the closed-form expressions for ϕµρ and x
∗(σ) above allow
us to compute µρ in closed-form. A string of calculations employing the law of iterated















∣∣∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ
]
. (3.12)
This formula will be useful to express the ex ante utility of the principal and then to
see constructively how changing the coarseness of the ratings partition affects investor
welfare. In particular, within the framework of the example, we will be able to provide
a less abstract proof of Proposition 31.
Before we proceed to the welfare analysis, we highlight one insight that the expres-







under the expectation operator in equation (3.11) is concave, so that if the distribution
of σ˜2 spreads out (for example in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance), then
µρ decreases, suggesting that the more distribution risk the agent faces, the less the
investor must compensate him despite his risk aversion, as captured by the social
planner’s lower welfare weight. This observation presents a puzzle: why would the
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agent, who is risk-averse, prefer a riskier distribution? The puzzle finds its resolution
in the observation that higher dispersion of the variance comes with option value, and
thus convexity, making him risk-loving over this kind of risk. The reason is that his
investment decision comes after the realization of the variance, and thus the riskier
decisions come with option value allowing him to adjust his investment decision to
market conditions: when σ2 is very low he will invest a lot in the risky asset, while
when it is high he will invest relatively more in the riskless bond.
Now return to the main analysis. To analyze welfare we use the equilibrium welfare






w˜(x)− ϕ(w˜(x))) ∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ] = u¯ µ2ρ (3.13)





w˜(x)− ϕ(w˜(x)))] = u¯E [µ2ρ˜] . (3.14)
Coarser Credit Ratings Are Pareto-Improving
Since competition means that agents always receive their reservation utilities, the main
result that coarsening credit ratings makes everyone better-off follows from comparing
the ex ante expected utility of the investor across ratings systems. To do this we use
formula (3.14) above combined with the connection between convex functions, second-
order stochastic dominance, and the law of iterated expectations.
Within the setting of the example, we can now provide a constructive proof for
Proposition 31 above, which says that coarse credit ratings Pareto dominate finer
ones.
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Our proof has two main steps. We summarize these steps briefly before giving the
full proof. The first step is to show that the investor’s ex ante expected utility is minus









E [Y | ρ˜ ]
)]
for (appropriately defined) c > 0, f ′′ > 0 and a random variable Y . The second step is
to show that the expectation conditional on coarse ratings second-order stochastically
dominates the expectation conditional on fine ratings,
E [Y | ρ˜c]
SOSD≻ E [Y | ρ˜f ].
Whence utility is greater under coarse ratings because minus a convex function is a
concave function, and, a` la risk aversion, the expectation of a concave function of
a stochastically dominated random variable is greater than the expectation of the
function of the dominated variable.





















































Note that c > 0 and f ′′(z) = z3/2/2 > 0.
Step 2: By definition,
E [Y | ρ˜c]
SOSD≻ E [Y | ρ˜f ]
if there exists a random variable ε˜ such that





∣∣E [Y | ρ˜c]] = 0.
For ε˜ = E [Y | ρ˜f ]− E [Y | ρ˜c] from the above, the condition is
E
[
E [Y | ρ˜f ]− E [Y | ρ˜c]




E [Y | ρ˜f ]
∣∣∣E [Y | ρ˜c]] = E [Y | ρ˜c].
Given the assumption σ(ρ˜c) ⊂ σ(ρ˜f ) and since conditioning destroys information—
σ
(
E [Y | ρ˜c]
) ⊂ σ(ρ˜c)—apply the law of iterated expectations firstly to add and then
to delete conditioning information to calculate that
E
[
E [Y | ρ˜f ]




E [Y | ρ˜f ]
∣∣∣ ρ˜c]




E [Y | ρ˜c]







Asset Manager’s Observed Contracts
The agent’s equilibrium contract is
ϕµρ(w) = aA +
w − aP − aA
1 + µρ
(3.15)
where µρ is defined in equation (3.12).
The compensation contract is affine in wealth, as are typical asset management
contracts. For the next result (and the next result only), consider a simplified but
realistic credit rating rule. Let ρ˜ define a partition of the realization of the variance
σ20 < σ
2
1 < · · · , namely
P{σ˜2 ∈ [σ2i , σ2i+1) | ρi} = 1.
Proposition 32. For i < j, µρi < µρj . Increases in the expected variance decrease the
































This follows from definition (3.4.1), which implies that σi+1 is greater than the expec-
tation of σ˜ conditional on ρi but less than the expect ion of σ˜ conditional on ρi+1. Now,
immediately from equation (3.12), µρi < µρi+1 and by induction µρi < µρj whenever
i < j. Combined with equation (3.15), the result implies that lower expected variances
correspond to steeper wealth compensation for agents.
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In the model, ratings describe the variance of the market portfolio. Define a “boom”
a realization of ρ˜ implying low expected variance. With this interpretation, proposition
32 says that employed agents have higher powered contracts in booms than in busts.
Since, almost uniformly, equity funds offer higher powered contracts than money mar-
ket funds, the model predicts that the in-flows to equity funds relative to money market
funds will be procyclical. Using a sample of US mutual fund data from 1991 to 2008,
Chalmers et al. (2010) finds that investors direct funds away from money market funds




Suppose that the agent receives an imperfect signal about the variance. Namely, he
observes the realization of a random variable s˜ that is not independent of σ˜. Then,









R˜ | ρ, s]+ (R¯ −Rf)2 .
The optimal contract is ϕµ(Rf+x(ρ, s)(R−Rf )) (where an equation analogue to (3.12)
determines µ).
Clearly, whenever σ(ρ˜) ⊂ σ(s˜), then x(ρ, s) does not depend on ρ and our main
result remains unchanged. If, instead, σ(ρ˜) 6⊂ σ(s˜) then a trade-off arises: finer credit
ratings still shut down risk sharing, but they increase allocational efficiency, i.e. the
portfolio weight is closer to first best. The net welfare effect is then ambiguous.
Our model and policy prescriptions therefore apply to markets in which delegated
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portfolio managers are better informed than credit rating agencies.
Additional Ratings’ Changes
In our model, ratings realize once, after agents offer contracts but before the investor
employs an agent. In reality, ratings upgrades and downgrades are frequent and in-
vestors and agents have long-term relationships. In the model, if ratings change after
the investor has employed an agent, the optimal contract above still induces the agent
to invest efficiently. The new rating influences the portfolio allocation only insofar as
it improves the agent’s information (cf. the preceding discussion of imperfect signals).
Ratings changes after the investor and agent commit to a relationship never decrease
efficiency and can be beneficial if they improve information. Our model therefore sug-
gests that making reference to ratings matters only because funds are looking to attract
new investors or because their current investors may withdraw their funds. The idea
finds support in the observation that hedge funds, who raise money infrequently via
long-term contracts do not make reference to ratings in their contracts.
3.5 Conclusion
Motivated by delegated asset managers’ frequent references to credit ratings in the
contracts they offer their clients, we study a delegation problem with adverse selection
in the presence of a public signal. We characterize the optimal contract between a
risk-averse principal and a risk-averse agent and show that while it does indeed depend
on the public signal, contracting on the public signal does not mitigate the incentive
problem. In fact, in contrast to previous literature, we find that decreasing the precision
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of the public signal is Pareto improving. The reason is that contracting on final wealth
implements efficient investment, so contracting on the public signal serves only to
inhibit risk sharing. Agents include the public signal in their contracts only to help
them compete.
We apply the model to a classical delegated portfolio management setting in which
delegated asset managers’ make a portfolio choice decision on behalf of their clients.
In this setting, we interpret the public signal as a credit rating. Our main policy pre-
scription is that credit rating agencies should provide information in forms prohibitive
to their inclusion in rigid contracts. This helps asset managers to provide insurance to
their clients in addition to expertise. Our recommendation is consistent with the pop-
ular suggestion that markets should eliminate the mechanistic reliance on ratings. Our
model also suggests investment mandates may contribute to the cyclicality of mutual
fund flows, providing further motivation for their abolition.
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3.6 Appendices
3.6.1 Proof of Lemma 27
Suppose, in anticipation of a contradiction, an equilibrium in which the employed agent








)) ∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρˆ] > u¯. (3.16)
We now show that another agent Aˆ has a profitable deviation. In order for a contract
Φˆε to be a profitable deviation for Aˆ it must (i) make the principal employ him given
ρˆ and (ii) give him expected utility greater than his reservation utility u¯ given ρˆ. The
subtlety in this proof is that Aˆ’s contract determines not only the allocation of surplus,
but also his action x. To circumvent the effect of changing actions on payoffs, we
construct Φˆε to induce the agent to choose the same action that he would have chosen
under Φˆ, but still to change the division of surplus. To summarize, Φˆε is a profitable








)) ∣∣ ρ˜ = ρˆ] > E [uP(w˜ − Φˆ(w˜)) ∣∣ ρ˜ = ρˆ] ,








)) ∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρˆ] > u¯,
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> w˜ − Φˆ(w˜),













which is satisfied for ε > 0 by the inverse function theorem since u′A > 0.
Condition (ii) holds for ǫ > 0 and sufficiently small. This follows from equation
(3.18) and inequality (3.16) with the continuity of uA.
Finally, condition (iii) is immediate from equation (3.18) since affine transforma-
tions of utility do not affect choices.
Thus the investor will employ agent Aˆ who will receive, given ρˆ, utility greater than
the utility that he would have received in the supposed equilibrium (in the supposed
equilibrium he was unemployed and he was obtaining u¯). Thus Φˆε is a profitable
deviation for Aˆ and Φ cannot be the contract of an agent employed at equilibrium
given ρˆ.
We have shown that the agent’s expected utility given any ρ cannot exceed u¯. To
conclude the proof, note that his utility can never be strictly less than u¯ because then
his expected utility would be less than his reservation utility.
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 30
The proof relies on the following lemma.
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Lemma 33. The efficient sharing rule ϕ is affine in wealth w.























The contract that implements efficient risk sharing is that which maximizes social
surplus (for appropriate welfare weight µ) for every realization of wealth. Now compute




uP(w − ϕ) + µρuA(ϕ)
)
= 0























which is affine in w.
We begin the proof of Proposition 30 with the agent’s incentive problem given the
contract ϕ and show through a series of manipulations that his incentives are aligned
with those of the social planner. We rely on the fact that u′P(w − ϕ) = µρu′A(ϕ), from
the definition of efficient risk sharing.


























∣∣∣ σ˜ = σ] = 0.
By Lemma 33 ϕ′ is a constant, thus we can pass it under the expectation operator.











∣∣∣ σ˜ = σ] = 0.





w˜(x)− ϕ(w˜(x)))w˜′(x) ∣∣∣ σ˜ = σ] = 0. (3.19)












w˜(x)− ϕ(w˜(x)))− µρu′A(ϕ(w˜(x)))] ∣∣∣ σ˜ = σ] , (3.20)
























w˜(x)− ϕ(w˜(x)))+ µρuA(ϕ(w˜(x))) ∣∣∣ σ˜ = σ] = 0.
This is the first-order condition of the social planner’s problem if he knows σ. Since
uP and uA are concave and w˜ is concave in x, the first order condition implies a global
maximum, viz. the incentive compatible x is a social optimum.
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3.6.3 Computation of Optimal Investment
The problem stated in line (3.9) is to find the optimal investment x∗ given the optimal
sharing rule stated in equation (3.8), namely














Rf + x(R˜− Rf )−A−B
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Rf + x(R˜− Rf )
)
− aA
)2) ∣∣∣ σ˜ = σ
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∣∣ σ˜ = σ]
(
(1− B)(A+ aP)− µB(A− aA)
(1− B)2 +B2µ − Rf
)
.
Substituting in for A and B from equation (3.21) in the numerator gives
(1−B)(A + aP)− µB(A− aA) = µ (aA + aP)
1 + µ
and substituting in for A and B from equation (3.21) in the denominator gives

























3.6.4 Computation of the Social Planner’s Weight
Immediately from plugging in the expressions for uA, ϕµρ , and x
∗ into equation (3.11),
observe that











)2 (R˜−Rf)− aP − aA





































































































































































∣∣∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ
]
.
Finally, solve for (1 + µρ)
2 and cross multiply to recover equation (3.12).
3.6.5 Computation of Expected Utility Given ρ
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aP − w˜ + aA + w˜ − aP − aA
1 + µρ
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aP + aA −Rf − x∗(σ˜)
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)2 ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ

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)2 ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ

 = 2|u¯|( 1 + µρ











)− ϕ(w˜(x∗(σ˜)), σ˜, ρ)) ∣∣∣ ρ˜ = ρ] = u¯ µ2ρ.
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Chapter 4
Credit Market Competition and
Corporate Investment
4.1 Introduction
This paper develops a theoretical model to address the question of how interbank
competition affects the nature of corporate investment, and how this effect is mitigated
by the emergences of “relationship banking” (see, for example, Boot and Thakor (2000)
and Petersen and Rajan (1995)). We conduct this analysis in the context of a general
equilibrium model in which search fractions—akin to those in the labour market—and
borrower-lender matching play an important role in determining equilibrium outcomes.
The analysis sheds light on some existing evidence on relationship lending and produces
new predictions.
The importance of the question we study is underscored by the fact that, in ev-
ery country, banks play a dominant role in the allocation of credit, with significant
consequences for corporate investment. It is widely recognised that interbank compe-
tition impinges on how banks allocate credit and how much of it they allocate (see,
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for example, Cetorelli (2001), and Ratnovski (2013)). This makes bank competition a
central aspect of bank regulatory policy. Not surprisingly, it is a topic that has received
substantial research attention.
At first blush, the question of whether higher bank competition is good for the
economy seems to be hardly worth debating. One’s economic intuition would say that
higher competition should increase welfare, since banks would pay higher deposit rates
and charge lower loans rates, facilitating higher deposit inflow and more lending to
consumers and firms, with a consequent increase in economic growth. While some
theoretical papers have confirmed this insight in banking models, others have pointed
out that this standard intuition is off-the-mark because it overlooks special features
that distinguish banks from other firms and also the potentially subtle effects of credit
market frictions.
Pagano (1993) develops a model in which lower interbank competition leads to
lower equilibrium lending and lower economic growth, a conclusion verified by Guz-
man (2000) in a general equilibrium model of capital accumulation. However, arrayed
against this conclusion are numerous other papers with different results. Shaffer (1997)
shows that a more competitive banking system may end up funding a lower-quality
borrower pool. Cao and Shi (2000) argue that higher competition would increase loan
rates and reduce loan supply. Dell’Ariccia (2000) develops a credit screening model
to show that higher competition among banks may dilute their incentives to screen
borrowers. Similarly, Manove, Padilla and Pagano (1998) show that, compared to
a competitive banking system, banks in a monopolistic system will screen borrowers
more and accept less collateral. There are also numerous theoretical papers that have
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examined the effect of interbank competition on risk-taking. Numerous papers have
formalized the intuition that, by diminishing the charter values of banks, increased
interbank competition generates incentives for banks to take higher risk (e.g. Hell-
mann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) and Repullo (2004)). However, some others have
argued the opposite—by lowering the interest rates that banks charge their borrowers,
increased interbank competition can induce borrowers to take less risk, thereby dimin-
ishing the default risk banks face. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) extend this logic
to show an inverse U-shaped relationship between bank competition and stability.
Our approach to the question of how interbank competition affects the credit market
is different. We are concerned first with how competition impacts the types of projects
firms invest in, and second with how this impact is influenced by the (endogenous)
emergence of relationship banking. This is important because, in an environment in
which firms have the discretion to choose whether to invest in say well-established
routine technologies or in specialized innovative technologies, it would be useful to
know the impact of interbank competition on this choice, since this would determine
the kinds of firms and technologies that emerge and thrive in the economy. In this
sense, our paper is in the tradition of Petersen and Rajan (1995) who show that young
firms receive more credit when the banking system is less competitive, and of Boot and
Thakor (2000) who develop a model in which greater competition among banks causes
banks to make more relationship loans, but each loan has lower added value for the
borrower.
The model we develop for our analysis is a general equilibrium model in which each
firm can choose between a “standardized” (low-risk) project and a “specialized” (“dif-
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ferentiated”, higher-risk) project. The bank can choose between relationship lending
and arm’s-length finance (or transaction lending, as in Boot and Thakor (2000)). In
some states of nature the standardized project has higher social value and in others
the specialized project has higher value. The bank commits to the type of financing
before the firm chooses its project, and the firm’s repayment obligation to the bank is
determined by bargaining to divide the net surplus. Competition among banks affects
the bank’s choice of relationship lending versus arm’s-length finance, and hence also
affects the type of project the firm chooses.
Our main result is that the equilibrium involves the firm making the efficient project
choice only for intermediate levels of interbank competition. When competition is
sufficiently low, the specialized project is chosen excessively, relative to the first-best.
When competition is sufficiently high, the standardized project is chosen excessively,
relative to the first-best. Only for intermediate levels of competition does efficient
project choice arise in equilibrium.
Our second main result is that the emergence of a relationship lender attenuates
some of the inefficiencies in project choice. If a relationship bank extends credit, the
inefficiency of excessive investment in the specialized project for low levels of competi-
tion disappears, but the inefficiency of excessive investment in the standardized project
for high levels of competition remains.
To explain the core intuition behind these results, we first develop a “toy version”
of the model. This model strips away some of the richness of the actual model in order
to get to the intuition directly. After this the actual model is presented in order to
more fully explore the various forces at work.
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In contrast to theories in which monopolistic banking systems are the safest (e.g.
Hellmann et al. (2000), Matutes and Vives (2000), and Repullo (2004)), in our analysis
such banking systems are excessively risky since specialized projects are riskier than
standardized projects. Our model predicts that the most competitive banking systems
will involve the least risk, which sheds light on the country-level empirical evidence
presented by Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2009) that more competitive banking systems
are less prone to systemic crises. However, the caveat suggested by our theory is that
this attainment of safety comes at the cost of over-investment in (safe) standardized
projects. Our result is also consistent with the empirical finding that firms invest less
in R&D-intensive projects when credit competition is high (e.g. Hombert and Matray
(2013)).
Another interpretation of our main result is that bank loan portfolios will become
most liquid when interbank competition is the highest. This is because a standardized
loan is more easily transferable and hence more liquid than a specialized loan. This
seems to accord well with casual observation, but we are not aware of existing empirical
evidence on this implication.
In addition to the papers discussed above, our work is related to the vast litera-
ture on relationship banking (e.g. Berlin and Mester (1992), Boot and Thakor (2000),
Inderst and Mueller (2004), Petersen and Rajan (1995), Rajan (1992), and Sharpe
(1990)); see Boot (2000) for a review. It is also related to how search frictions in the
credit market (e.g. Diamond (1990)) affect credit outcomes, as in Wasmer and Weil
(2004)).
The rest of the paper is organized in four remaining sections. Section 4.2 introduces
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the “toy model.” Section 4.3 develops the actual model. Section 4.4 contains the
analysis. Section 4.5 concludes. All formal proofs are in the Appendix.
4.2 Toy Model
In this section we introduce a simplified version of the model that pins down the
intuition of the main results. At the core of the model is the project choice of an
entrepreneur who needs outside capital to fund his investment. The entrepreneur
chooses between two projects, called standardized and differentiated (or “specialized”).
Both projects cost I to implement. The standardized project is positive NPV with a
deterministic cash flow, in particular it generates Vs > I for sure. The differentiated
project, in contrast, is both information-sensitive and risky. To capture information
sensitivity, we allow the differentiated project to be one of two types, which we refer
to as high and low. Both the high-type and the low-type differentiated projects have
binary risky cash flows. They pay off Vd when they succeed and zero otherwise. The
difference between the types is the success probability. The high-type project yields Vd
with probability ph whereas the low-type project yields Vd with probability pℓ < ph. We
assume that the high-type differentiated project has the highest NPV but the low-type
differentiated project has the lowest NPV, namely
pℓVd < Vs < phVd.
This assumption implies that efficient investment requires adapting to circumstances,
viz. an entrepreneur with a high-type differentiated project should undertake it, while
an entrepreneur with a low-type differentiated project should undertake a standardized
project.
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The entrepreneur borrows from the creditor via a debt contract with face value
F . Credit competition affects project choice via its affect on the terms of debt, i.e.
on this face value F . For simplicity, we assume here that an entrepreneur and a
creditor divide the net surplus of their relationship fifty-fifty, where the net surplus
is the total value created by the funded project less the outside options of the two
parties. Thus, the outside options will be essential in determining the terms of debt F .
We make the following three assumptions about the players’ outside options: (1) The
creditor’s outside option is the value I of his capital. (2) If the entrepreneur chooses
the differentiated project, his outside option is zero, written πde = 0. The motivation
is that the differentiated project is information-sensitive, and adverse selection in the
credit market will make it impossible for the entrepreneur to find funding for his project
elsewhere. Thus, if he chooses the differentiated project he is captive to his creditor.
(3) If an entrepreneur chooses the standardized project, his outside option, labelled
πse, depends on the competitiveness of the credit market. The motivation is as follows:
since the project is information-insensitive, the entrepreneur will not suffer from the
effects of adverse selection and other creditors will be able to fund his project. When
the credit market is competitive, it will be easy to find another creditor to fund the
project and the entrepreneur’s outside option will be high; when the credit market
is uncompetitive, it will be hard to find another creditor to fund the project and
the entrepreneur’s outside option will be low. Here we take πse to represent credit
competition directly. (In the full model, we model credit market competition explicitly
within a search framework and demonstrate this connection with πse explicitly.)
The stage is now set to present the main result: for only intermediate values of
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credit competition will the entrepreneur choose the efficient project. When credit
competition is too low, the entrepreneur over-differentiates, choosing the differentiated
project even when it is the low-type. When competition is too high, in contrast, the
entrepreneur over-standardizes, choosing the standardized project even when he has a
high-type differentiated project.
Before deriving the result explicitly in the toy model, we outline the intuition for
each of these inefficiencies. First consider the entrepreneur with the low-type differen-
tiated project. He wishes to standardize to increase the net surplus, but knows that by
differentiating he will have an informational advantage, and may receive a cross-subsidy
from the high-type. When competition is high the entrepreneur’s strong bargaining
position from standardization gives him the incentive not to choose the low-NPV dif-
ferentiated project. For low levels of competition, however, the entrepreneur has no
extra incentive to standardize and prefers to differentiate inefficiently. Now turn to the
entrepreneur with the high-type differentiated project. He wishes to differentiate to
increase the surplus, but knows that by doing so he will lower his outside option and
thus worsen his borrowing terms. For high levels of credit competition the entrepreneur
values his lower cost of borrowing from standardizing so much that he never differenti-
ates. To summarize, credit competition mitigates the over-differentiation problem by
increasing the value of safe projects to the entrepreneur. However, for high levels of
competition this same effect leads the entrepreneur not to differentiate enough.
We now derive the result in the toy model. Suppose an efficient equilibrium and
demonstrate how too much or too little credit competition leads the entrepreneur to
deviate. Recall that πse proxies for competition. The first step is to calculate the face
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values of debt Fs and Fd that the entrepreneur must promise to repay in order to fund
the standardized and differentiated projects respectively. Recall that they divide the
net surplus fifty-fifty. The net surplus from standardization is Vs−I−πse, so Fs returns
the creditor’s investment I to him in addition to half the net surplus,
Fs = I +
Vs − I − πse
2
.
The efficient outcome under consideration is separating, so only high-type entrepreneurs
choose the differentiated project. Thus the net surplus given the differentiated project
is phVd− I−πde = phVd− I since πde = 0 by assumption. Now the creditor must receive
his investment I plus half the net surplus in expectation, so




Now, when is it incentive compatible for the entrepreneur with the high-type project
to differentiate? He chooses the differentiated project as long as
ph(Vd − Fd) ≥ Vs − Fs
which rewrites as
phVd − I ≥ Vs − I + πse
or, writing ∆V := phVd − Vs,
πse ≤ ∆V
which says exactly that entrepreneurs with high-type projects differentiate only if credit
competition does not exceed the surplus gains from differentiation. When competition
is too high entrepreneurs standardize inefficiently.
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Next, when is it incentive compatible for the entrepreneur with the low-type project
to standardize? He chooses the standardized project as long as
Vs − Fs ≥ pℓ(Vd − Fd)
which rewrites as




Here the right-hand side is the payoff of an entrepreneur with a low-type project from
borrowing at the terms of the entrepreneur with a high-type project. When competi-
tion πse is high, the inequality is satisfied because the gained bargaining position from
standardization curbs the entrepreneur’s incentive to over-differentiate. When compe-
tition is low, however, this mechanism is not in place; the inequality is violated and
risk-shifting occurs.
Thus we see two-sides of credit market competition. Because higher competition
encourages entrepreneurs with both high-type and low-type differentiated projects to
standardize, increasing competition simultaneously curbs the incentive for entrepreneurs
to over-differentiate when they have low-type projects while exacerbating the incen-
tive for them to over-standardize when they have high-type projects. In particular
the equations above imply immediately that entrepreneurs with both types of projects
invest efficiently for only intermediate levels of credit competition, i.e. only if
pℓ
ph
(phVd − I)− (Vs − I) ≤ πse ≤ ∆V. (4.1)
Both these inefficiencies stem from the entrepreneur’s choosing inefficiently to bene-
fit from better funding terms. So far we have assumed that the creditor cannot observe
the type of the differentiated project. Can a creditor with the expertise to assess the
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quality of the entrepreneur’s project mitigate the inefficiencies that result from too
much or too little credit competition? To address this question we introduce a rela-
tionship lender who can observe the type of the entrepreneur’s differentiated project.
Our next main result is that the entrepreneur with the low-type differentiated project
no longer over-differentiates when competition is low if he obtains funding from a rela-
tionship lender. The reason is that over-differentiation is driven by the entrepreneur’s
incentive to access cheap funding by choosing the differentiated project even though it
is low-type. However, this funding advantage disappears when a creditor can observe
the project type.
The argument above shows that relationship lending can mitigate the over-differentiation
problem and thus increase efficiency when there is little credit competition. For high
competition, in contrast, the entrepreneur with the high-type differentiated project
continues to over-standardize when competition is high, even if he obtains funding
from a relationship lender. The reason is that the creditor’s ability to observe the type
of the entrepreneur’s differentiated project does not make the entrepreneur less captive
to his creditor when he chooses the differentiated project. Thus the entrepreneur with
the high-type differentiated project still over-standardizes to avoid the relatively poor
terms of debt he obtains when he differentiates. To summarize, relationship banking
is valuable in relatively uncompetitive credit markets but fails to reduce the inefficient
standardization that high competition causes.
While the toy model shows the main mechanism behind the main results, it relies
on a number of shortcuts. Notably, we made the following assumptions to keep the
analysis simple: (1) the creditor and entrepreneur split the surplus fifty-fifty, (2) the
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outside option of the entrepreneur with the differentiated project is zero, (3) the outside
option of the entrepreneur with the standardized project proxies for credit market
competition, and (4) relationship lending is costless. In the full model we micro-found
or relax each of these assumptions using a dynamic search and matching framework.
The complete model confirms the robustness of the intuition above as well as provides
additional results. The most important result that the toy model does not deliver is
that for very low levels of competition a creditor may be unwilling to make a positive
NPV investment in a relationship lending technology due to a hold-up problem.
4.3 Model
4.3.1 Agents and Projects
There are two kinds of players, creditors and entrepreneurs. All players are risk-neutral
and discount the future at net rate r equal to the return on the money market account.
A creditor c provides start-up capital I to penniless entrepreneur e to fund a project
δ. e has a choice between two projects, called standardized, δ = s, and differentiated,
δ = d. A standardized project is information-insensitive and riskless. It pays off
Vs for sure. In contrast, a differentiated project is information-sensitive—because its
cash flow distribution is e’s private information—and risky—because its cash flows are
random. Specifically, a differentiated project is one of two types, τ˜ ∈ {h, ℓ}, which e
will observe before choosing δ ∈ {d, s}. The h-type differentiated project pays off Vd
with probability ph and zero otherwise, whereas the ℓ-type differentiated project pays
off Vd with probability pℓ < ph and zero otherwise. The probability that the project is
type h is α. All random variables are independent.
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Before granting a loan, a creditor chooses the type of credit η to provide. He
either offers relationship lending, η = r, or arms-length finance, η = a. The difference
between a relationship lender and an arm’s-length lender is that the relationship lender
can observe the differentiated entrepreneur’s type, whereas an arm’s length lender
cannot. The creditor can always offer arm’s-length finance at no cost, but to perform
relationship lending he must pay a cost k. Finally, the cost k is entrepreneur-specific,
in other words it allows him to learn the type of only one entrepreneur’s project.
An h-type differentiated project has the highest present value, but the standardized
project has a higher present value than the ℓ-type differentiated project, which has
negative NPV, or
phVd − I > Vs − I > 0 > pℓVd − I. (4.2)
Further, a standardized project has higher present value than the average differentiated
project, or
Vs > αphVd + (1− α)pℓVd. (4.3)
Thus, it is efficient for the h-type entrepreneur to invest in the differentiated project
and for the ℓ-type entrepreneur to invest in the standardized project. We also assume
that the efficiency gains from the efficient project choice exceed the cost of relationship
lending, i.e.
αphVd + (1− α)Vs − k > Vs.
or
k < α∆V (4.4)
where ∆V := phVd−Vs. The motivation for this assumption is that relationship lenders’
ability to observe the project type gives them the flexibility to adapt to the different
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circumstances represented by the type of entrepreneurs’ differentiated projects. The
benefit of creditors’ flexibility is the ability to ensure that entrepreneurs invest in the
most efficient project in every circumstance. This is a benefit that creditors who
extend arm’s length finance do not enjoy. The assumption above says that the benefit
of flexibility outweighs the cost k of the relationship.
Search and Matching
Creditors and entrepreneurs find each other by searching in a decentralized market.
At time t ∈ {...,−1, 0, 1, ...} a set Et of searching entrepreneurs matches with a set
Ct of creditors with intensity m(|Et|, |Ct|). Define θt := |Ct|/|Et|, the credit market








depend only on θt (for which, for example, m being homogenous of degree one suffices).
Assume m is such that q and Q are differentiable with q′ < 0, Q′ > 0, q(0) = 1,
Q(0) = 0, and with q(θ)→ 0 and Q(θ)→ 1 as θ→∞. As credit competition increases
the likelihood that a creditor finds an entrepreneur decreases and that an entrepreneur
finds a creditor increases.
To make the model stationary, assume that each player that leaves the market is
replaced by a player of the same type.
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Stage Game Extensive Form
When an entrepreneur e is born he learns his type. When e ∈ Et matches with a
creditor c ∈ Ct for the first time, they play the extensive game defined by the timing
below:
1. c chooses between relationship lending and arm’s-length finance, η ∈ {r, a}. r
costs k and enables the creditor to observe the type of the differentiated project.
2. If c has played η = r, he observes the type τ˜ ∈ {h, ℓ} of the differentiated project.
3. e chooses between a differentiated project and a standardized project, δ ∈ {d, s}.
The choice is irreversible.
4. The face value of debt F is determined as follows
• With probability β, c makes e a take-it-or-leave-it offer F cδ ; e accepts or
rejects.
• With probability 1− β, e makes c a take-it-or-leave-it offer F eδ ; c accepts or
rejects.
5. The project pays off Vδ ∈ {Vs, Vd}. e and c divide the surplus according to the
agreed contract.
If the relationship between c and e breaks down, they search again in the market.
Since e’s choice δ is irreversible, it remains to specify the game played between an
entrepreneur committed to a project δ and his new potential creditor c′.
1. c′ observes δ.
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2. c′ chooses between relationship lending and arm’s-length finance, η ∈ {r, a}. r
costs k and enables the creditor to observe the type of the differentiated project.
3. The face value of debt F is determined as follows
• With probability β, c makes e a take-it-or-leave-it offer F c
′
δ ; e accepts or
rejects.
• With probability 1 − β, e makes c′ a take-it-or-leave-it offer F eδ ; c′ accepts
or rejects.
If c and e are searching but not matched at date t they search again.
Throughout the solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
4.4 Results
This section establishes the main results (1) that the first-best is attainable for only
intermediate levels of credit market competitiveness and (2) that relationship lending
can mitigate the inefficiency but only for low levels of credit competition.
4.4.1 Background Mechanism
We establish the results first in partial equilibrium taking the players’ continuation
values as given. This analysis resembles that of the toy model in section 4.2. We then
endogenize the continuation values and prove the results in terms of the ratio θ of
creditors to entrepreneurs, which we call the credit market competition.
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Out of Equilibrium Beliefs
Since this is a dynamic game of asymmetric information, off-the-equilibrium path be-
liefs about the type τ of an entrepreneur’s project will play a role in the analysis.
Throughout we focus on equilibria supported by the following beliefs: if a creditor
matches with an entrepreneur who has already differentiated his project (necessarily
because he failed to obtain funding from the creditor he was initially matched with),
then the creditor believes the project is type ℓ. We summarize this with the following
assumption.
Assumption 4.4.1. If a creditor encounters an entrepreneur with an already differ-
entiated project, he believes the project is type ℓ, written µ(τ˜ = ℓ | δ = d) = 1.
We emphasize that this is not an assumption on primitives, but just a statement
about which Perfect Bayesian Equilibria we focus on. We find these equilibria most
intuitive because the differentiated project is information-sensitive and we wish to
capture the idea that it may be difficult to find funding for an information-sensitive
project due to adverse selection. If he chooses a standardized project, an entrepreneur
avoids the risk of adverse selection in the future. He obtains the advantage of a higher
outside option and better terms of debt from his creditor.
Some readers may find it unappealing that we restrict the out of equilibrium beliefs.
In this case they can replace the restriction with a more direct assumption on the nature
of the differentiated project. For example, if it is also time-sensitive, because the rents
from specialisation are available only if an entrepreneur implements his project before
a competitor, then his outside option will be affected analogously.
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Further, we add that for other out-of-equilibrium beliefs the model is still solvable
and that for relatively pessimistic creditors or low average NPV differentiated projects
the qualitative results still hold. Considering more optimistic beliefs of the creditor will
indeed attenuate our results for high levels of credit competition, making it less likely
that entrepreneurs will over-standardize, but it will exacerbate the over-differentiation
inefficiency that we find for low levels of credit competition.
Continuation Values
When c and e are matched, their decisions as to whether to engage in relationship
lending and whether to undertake a differentiated project depend on the proportion
of the total surplus from the match that they anticipate earning. For each player, a
higher outside option leads to a greater share of net surplus.
At the time at which the face value of debt is determined, these outside options are
equal to the players’ continuation values from searching again in the market. Denote the
continuation value of the creditor by πc and the continuation value of the entrepreneur
with project δ by πδe . We emphasize that because his project choice is irreversible, the
continuation value of the entrepreneur depends on his project choice. Note that, in
general, these values could depend on time, but we suppress this possibility since we
will focus on stationary equilibria. Further, the continuation value of the entrepreneur
with the differentiated project could also depend on the type τ of his project. However,
since the entrepreneur with the differentiated project will have his credit completely
rationed in the future, this will also not be the case, as the following lemma implies.
Lemma 34. The continuation value of the already differentiated entrepreneur is zero,
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i.e. πde = 0.
Proof. The short proof is in Appendix 4.6.1.
4.4.2 First-Best
The efficient outcome of this model involves the entrepreneur choosing the efficient
project, namely δ = d when τ = h and δ = s when τ = ℓ and the creditor playing η = a,
avoiding the cost k of relationship lending. Our question is when is this outcome (η =
a, δh = d, δℓ = s) implementable? Specifically, for which values of credit competition θ
can it emerge in equilibrium? We now proceed to find conditions for it to be a stationary
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model given the out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ(ℓ | d) =
1.
For this to be an equilibrium, e must self-select the efficient project without the
discipline of his creditor—c cannot observe the type of the differentiated project since
η = a. The main results come from finding conditions for e’s incentive constraints to
be satisfied.
Before finding these conditions, we emphasize the equilibrium beliefs for clarity.
Since beliefs must be consistent in equilibrium, creditors who observe entrepreneurs
choose d must believe they have h-type projects.
Face Values
The face value F of debt depends on which player is proposing the contract in round
4 of the stage game (subsection 4.3.1).
The proposer always offers the face value that makes his opponent indifferent be-
tween accepting and rejecting. Thus there are four cases: (1) when e proposes and he
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has a standardized project, (2) when c proposes when e has a standardized project,
(3) when e proposes and he has a differentiated project, and (4) when c proposes and
e has a differentiated project.
We now compute each of these face values under the equilibrium beliefs. Note that
when e chooses s, there is no asymmetric information so the face value just serves
as a means to divide surplus—it will not enter substantively in the analysis. When
the project is differentiated the face value of the debt contract will matter. Here the
subscripts on the face values denote the project choice and the superscripts denote the
proposer. When e proposes the face value with a standardized project is
F es = πc
and when c proposes and e has chosen a standardized project the face value is given
by
Vs − F cs = πse.
When e proposes with a differentiated project c gets repaid with probability ph so the




and when c proposes and e has chosen a differentiated project the face value is given
by
ph(Vd − F cd) = πde .
Incentive Constraints
If c believes that everyone is playing according to the profile (η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s), he
never has incentive to deviate to η = r since it comes with a cost k and no informational
124
benefit. Thus to ask when this outcome is an equilibrium we can focus entirely on e’s
incentive constraints. We find conditions first for δℓ = s and then for δh = d.
In order for δℓ = s, the entrepreneur must prefer to standardize when his project is
type ℓ. Recall that in round 4 of the stage game the creditor proposes with probability
β. Thus with probability β e receives his outside option and with probability 1− β e
pushes c to his outside option. Hence for e to choose to standardize with the ℓ-type
differentiated project it must be that
βπse + (1− β)(Vs − F es ) ≥ βπde + (1− β)pl(Vd − F ed )
or, plugging in,
(1− β)(Vs − πc)+ βπse ≥ (1− β) pℓph (phVd − πc) . (ICℓ)
For e to choose to differentiate with the h-type differentiated project it must be that
βπde + (1− β)ph (Vd − F ed) ≥ βπse + (1− β) (Vs − F es )
or, plugging in,
(1− β)phVd ≥ (1− β)Vs + βπse. (ICh)
Combining the incentive constraints (ICℓ) and (ICh) implies that the first best can be
attained in equilibrium if and only if








e ≤ ∆V, (4.7)
recalling that ∆V := phVd− Vs. These inequalities are the analogue of the inequalities
(4.1) in the toy model described in Section 4.2 above. Next, we find the values of πc
and πse in terms of credit competition θ.
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Value Functions
To demonstrate that if credit competition is either too intense or too weak real in-
vestment is choked off, compute the continuation values given that players believe
(η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s) is the stationary action profile of the stage game.
We look for stationary equilibria of the model. The players’ value functions from
continuing to search determine the offers their opponents make in round 4 of the
stage game. These offers determine the division of surplus. The creditor has a single
continuation value πc, whereas the entrepreneur’s continuation value depends on his
project choice, δ ∈ {s, d}. Lemma 34 fixes πde = 0. It remains to compute πse and πc.
πc and π
s
e will be interdependent: a higher πc lowers π
s
e because e anticipates having
to give a larger share of the net surplus to c and vice versa.
On the (η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s) equilibrium path, creditors always fund entrepreneurs
the first time that they are matched. But it must be incentive compatible for the
creditor to agree to fund a standardized entrepreneur rather than search again to wait
for a differentiated entrepreneur. As long as players are sufficiently impatient this will
always be the case. Specifically, to ensure that standardized projects are funded, we




Vs − I .
Note that we view the time between dates as relatively long since it is the time taken
to develop a lending relationship and implement a project. Thus we do not consider
the assumption that r is large to be overly restrictive.
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We now proceed to compute the value functions maintaining the assumption that
standardized entrepreneurs will find funding when they are matched. After computing
the equilibrium value functions, observe that Assumption 4.4.2 suffices for this to be
the case.
The players’ value functions are their expected utilities today from continuing the
game. Consider first the standardized entrepreneur. He will be matched tomorrow
with probability Q = Q(θ) and will be unmatched with probability 1 − Q. If he is
unmatched he searches again. Since the equilibrium is stationary, he obtains πse in this
case. If he is matched the creditor is the proposer with probability 1− β. In this case
again the entrepreneur obtains πse. With probability β, however, the entrepreneur is
the proposer and in this case he obtains (1− β)(Vs− πc) (see Section 4.7 above). This

















The explanation for the expression for the creditor’s value function πc resembles
that of the entrepreneur who has a standardized project in the previous paragraph. It
is two terms more complex, however. The first extra term arises because the creditor
can be matched with two types of entrepreneurs: one with a high-type differentiated
project (who plays δ = d) and one with a low-type differentiated project (who plays
δ = s). The second extra term arises because the creditor earns interest on the capital
I he has not invested. We now describe the terms that we must take into account
to write down the creditor’s value function. He is matched with probability q = q(θ).
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With probability 1−q he is unmatched and searches again to receive πc, by stationarity.
If he is matched, with probability α he is matched with an entrepreneur who has an
h-type differentiated project and who chooses to do this differentiated project. In this
case e proposes with probability 1−β, leaving c with πc. With probability β c proposes
and his utility is phVd since π
d
e = 0. Finally consider the case in which c is matched
with an entrepreneur who has an ℓ-type differentiated project. e then chooses to do
the standardized project. Again, with probability 1−β e proposes and c gets πc. With
probability β c proposes and gets Vs − πse. The final term is the interest rI that the
creditor earns from holding his capital in the money-market account while searching.






























We can now solve for the equilibrium value functions, which are the solution of the
system of equations (4.8) and (4.10).
Lemma 35. In a stationary equilibrium with action profile (η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s), the
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πc = I +
βq




α∆V + Vs − I
]
+ α(1− β)Q(phVd − I)
)
.
One of the key short cuts we took in the toy model of Section 4.2 was that πse proxied
for competition. The next lemma says that πse is strictly increasing in competition θ,
so the shortcut is now micro-founded.
Lemma 36. In a stationary equilibrium with action profile (η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s), π
s
e
is increasing in θ.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix 4.6.2. It simply applies the quotient rule to πse keeping
in mind the assumptions on the matching probabilities, namely q′(θ) < 0 andQ′(θ) > 0.
The Two Sides of Credit Market Competition
The inequalities (4.7) show the efficient outcome can be supported in equilibrium for
only intermediate values of πse. Then, Lemma 36 shows that π
s
e indeed proxies for
competition θ. This section shows that the intuition established in the toy model of
Section 4.2 is robust: when competition θ is too high or too low the efficient outcome
is not an equilibrium.
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There is a stationary equilibrium with action profile (η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s) only if credit
competition θ is neither too large nor too small.
Proof. The proof is in appendix 4.6.3. It follows from considering the limits of πse and
πc as θ → 0 and θ →∞ and comparing them to the bounds in the incentive constraints
(ICh) and (ICℓ).
4.4.3 Second Best
We now ask whether the creditors’ option to develop a relationship with the en-
trepreneur can restore efficient project choice when credit market competition is too
high or too low for entrepreneurs to self-select the efficient project (as stated in Propo-
sition 37).
Since relationship lending entails an expense k for a creditor, efficiency is not re-
stored fully, however recall that the assumptions (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4), say that
(
αph + (1− α)pℓ
)
Vd < Vs < αVd + (1− α)Vs − k,
which imply that the surplus gains from efficient project choice outweigh the cost of
relationship lending. Thus the second-best outcome is (η = r, δh = d, δℓ = s). When
does it constitute a stationary equilibrium?
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Off Equilibrium Path Behaviour
To find the conditions for this action profile to be part of an equilibrium, we must
specify the behaviour off the equilibrium path. In particular, if c plays η = a and
e plays δ = d, what does c believe about the type of e’s project? We will focus on
equilibria in which e plays s following c playing a. This is the unique off-path behaviour
if the entrepreneur with the h-type differentiated project always prefers to play s than
to pool with the entrepreneur with the ℓ-type project. (If self-selected separation were
possible we could implement first best anyway.) A sufficient condition for uniqueness






αph + (1− α)pℓ − 1
)
I.
Further we maintain the focus on only equilibria in which a creditor believes that if
he encounters an entrepreneur with a differentiated project off-equilibrium he believes
the project is type ℓ, µ(τ = ℓ | δ = d) = 0.
Face Values
As in Subsection 4.4.2 above, the face value of debt depends on who is the proposer
in round 4 of the stage game and on the project choice. Since we are looking for an
equilibrium in which η = r, the creditor also observes the type of the differentiated
project. Note that the entrepreneur with the ℓ-type differentiated project will not ob-
tain funding for it—it is negative NPV and the creditor observes the type τ . Thus,
following η = r, e always plays δ = s if he has an ℓ-type differentiated project. Thus
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again there are four face values to compute: (1) when e proposes and he has a stan-
dardized project, (2) when c proposes and e has a standardized project, (3) when e
proposes and he has an h-type differentiated project, and (4) when c proposes and e
has an h-type differentiated project. The expressions for the face values are identical
to those in Subsection 4.4.2. The key difference is that the continuation values πse and
πc are different. Also, keep in mind that, even though the notation is unchanged, when
the project is differentiated the creditor observes whether τ = ℓ or τ = h whereas
before he did not. To summarize, the face values are
F es = πc,
F cs = Vs − πse,
F ed = πc/ph,
F cd = Vd.
Entrepreneurs’ Incentive Constraints
As already mentioned in the previous section, if c has played η = r, then whenever
e has an ℓ-type differentiated project he plays δ = s. Thus to check whether there is
a stationary equilibrium with action profile (η = r, δh = d, δℓ = s), we need to check
the incentive constraint for only the entrepreneur with the h-type project. As in the
first-best, he plays δ = d whenever







This is the incentive constraint (ICh) already written down above, but bear in mind
that πse depends on the equilibrium.
Creditors’ Incentive Constraint
Unlike in the first-best case, a creditor’s incentive constraint now has bite. If he deviates
to η = a he saves the cost k of relationship lending, but forgoes the increased rents he
gains when e has an h-type differentiated project. If he chooses η = a he anticipates
that the entrepreneur will standardize (see Assumption 4.4.3 and the discussion in
Subsection 4.4.3). Therefore, his expected payoff is βF cs +(1−β)πc. If he chooses η = r
the expression for his payoff is more complicated for two reasons: (1) he must take into
account the possibility that he is matched with an entrepreneur who has an ℓ-type
differentiated project as well as the possibility that he is matched with an entrepreneur
who has an h-type differentiated project; and (2) he must pay the cost k of relationship
lending. If he is matched with an entrepreneur with an ℓ-type differentiated project,
e standardizes and c’s payoff is again βF cs + (1 − β)πc, whereas if c is matched with
an entrepreneur with an h-type differentiated project, e differentiates and c’s payoff is
βphF
c





d + (1− β)πc
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Note that the incentive constraints (ICh) and (ICc) combine to say that the second-best
action profile (η = r, δh = d, δℓ = s) is attainable if only if
k
αβ




Thus, taking πse again as a proxy for competition, we see that even with relation-
ship lending efficient project choice is possible only for intermediate levels of credit
competition. The inequalities above already convey the essence of our main results
about relationship lending. First, relationship lending can mitigate the inefficiencies
in entrepreneurs’ project choice for only low levels of competition (the upper bound
(1 − β)∆V/β coincides with the upper bound in the inequalities (4.7)). Second, only
if the cost k is small enough (k ≤ αβ∆V ), does relationship lending fully prevent the
over-differentiation problem that was present for low levels of credit competition. If
k is larger, the creditor’s incentive constraint will be violated and he will prefer to
perform arm’s-length lending and save the cost k: there is a hold-up problem because
even though the total surplus created α∆V exceeds the cost k (assumption (4.4)), the
proportion of the increased surplus that c receives may not exceed it.
Value Functions
To express the range of competition for which (η = r, δh = d, δℓ = s) is the stationary
action profile in equilibrium, compute the players’ continuation values as value func-
tions. This is analogous and very similar to the calculations in Subsection 4.4.2. In


















The only difference between πc in the efficient equilibrium (that with stationary action
profile (η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s) above) and πc in the equilibrium under consideration
(with stationary action profile (η = r, δh = d, δℓ = s)) is that when c is matched with an
entrepreneur he first pays k to invest in a relationship with e. Thus his value function


































We can now solve for the equilibrium value functions, which are the solutions of
the system of equations (4.11) and (4.12). The next lemma summarises them.
Lemma 38. In stationary equilibrium with action profile (η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s), the
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α∆V + Vs − I
)
+ α(1− β)Q(phVd − I)]− [r + (1− β)Q]k)
r(r + βq) + (1− β)Q(r + αβq) .
When Can Relationship Lending Restore Efficiency?
This subsection presents our two main results about relationship lending. First, rela-
tionship lending completely solves the over-differentiation inefficiency that arises for low
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levels of competition as long as k ≤ αβ∆V . However, when k > αβ∆V the inefficiency
persists for sufficiently low levels of competition. Second, relationship lending does not
mitigate the over-standardization problem that arises for high levels of competition.
The next lemma states the first of these results.
Proposition 39. Relationship lending restores efficiency for low levels of credit com-
petition if and only if k ≤ αβ∆V . I.e. for low θ, there is a stationary equilibrium with
action profile (η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s) if and only if k ≤ αβ∆V
Proof. The proof is in Appendix 4.6.4. It simply demonstrates when the creditor’s
incentive constraint (ICc) is violated.
As we already touched on above, the result depends on two forces. First, a creditor
will never fund an ℓ-type differentiated project when he observes its type because
it has negative NPV by assumption (4.2). Thus, the entrepreneur with the ℓ-type
differentiated project knows that if he plays δ = d he will receive payoff zero and
prefers to standardize. However, the creditor must pay the entire cost k to perform
relationship lending. Even though the total surplus gains are positive by assumption
(4.4), the proportion of those surplus gains allocated to the creditor may not suffice to
justify bearing them privately. Due to this hold-up problem there may still be inefficient
project choice for low levels of competition. Note that this intuition is already present
from the creditor’s incentive constraint (ICc) taking π
s
e as a proxy for competition. The
proposition above combined with Lemma 38 simply confirms the intuition in general
equilibrium.
The next main result relies more heavily on the general equilibrium framework pro-
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vided by the search model. It says that the entrepreneur’s incentive to over-standardize
is stronger in the equilibrium with action profile (η = r, δh = d, δℓ = s).
Proposition 40. Relationship lending never restores efficiency for high levels of credit
competition. I.e. if there is no stationary equilibrium with action profile (η = r, δh =
d, δℓ = s) for θ > θ¯, then there is no stationary equilibrium with action profile (η =
a, δh = d, δℓ = s) for θ > θ¯.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix 4.6.5.
Put more simply, if, for any level of competition θ, the entrepreneur with the h-type
differentiated project plays δ = s in the equilibrium with action profile (η = a, δh =
d, δℓ = s) then the entrepreneur with the h-type differentiated project plays δ = s
in the equilibrium with action profile (η = r, δh = d, δℓ = s). That is to say that the
incentive to standardize is even stronger when the creditor chooses relationship lending
than when the creditor chooses arm’s-length finance. The reason is that the creditor is
in a weaker bargaining position looking forward when he is doing relationship lending.
Because c bears the cost k his outside option is relatively low. e takes advantage of
c’s low outside option to negotiate better loan terms and capture more of the surplus.
This means that standardization is even more attractive for e when c is playing η = r




This paper develops a general equilibrium model of competition in the banking market
to investigate the question of how banking competition affects corporate investment.
In the model entrepreneurs have two projects, a (safe) “standardized” project and a
(risky) “differentiated” (or “specialized”) project. Which efficient project to undertake
depends on the state of nature, so efficient investment requires adapting to circum-
stances. The paper has two main results. The first main result is that project choice
is inefficient when banking competition is both too high and too low. Specifically,
when competition in the banking market is too low, entrepreneurs over-differentiate,
inefficiently forgoing the standardized project. When competition is too high, in con-
trast, entrepreneurs over-standardize, inefficiently foregoing the differentiated project.
The key force is that entrepreneurs with standardized projects can find funding more
easily in the future, thus they can obtain better terms of debt from their creditors.
This pushes entrepreneurs toward the standardized project, and the effect is strongest
in competitive credit markets. The second main result is that relationship banking
can mitigate the over-differentiation inefficiency that emerges for low levels of credit
competition but not the over-standardization inefficiency that emerges for high lev-
els of competition. The reason is that relationship banking allows banks to make
more informed lending decisions, mitigating inefficiencies that arise from the asymmet-
ric information that is associated with a specialized project. However, relationships
with borrowers do not affect banks’ ability to fund standardized projects; relationship
banking cannot force entrepreneurs not to standardize. Our results emphasize that the
composition of the banking market is intimately connected with the nature of real in-
138
vestment. While some papers (e.g. Hellmann et al. (2000) and Repullo (2004)) suggest
that monopolistic banking systems are safe, we find a new channel by which uncom-
petitive banking systems induce firms to choose excessively risky projects. While these
papers suggest that credit competition induces banks to take on too much risk, we
show a countervailing force by which high competition leads entrepreneurs to choose
safer projects. Our channel would cause the loans in banks’ portfolios to be safer when
competition is high, thus suggesting that, in order to study systemic risk, future re-
search must jointly consider the effects of credit competition on entrepreneurs’ project
choice and on banks’ risk-taking.
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4.6 Appendices
4.6.1 Proof of Lemma 34
Given the assumption 4.4.1 on out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the creditor believes that he
knows the quality of the project so will not pay k to gain information via relationship
lending. Further, the assumption 4.2 that the ℓ-type differentiated project has negative
NPV, there is no face value that will deliver a positive expected payoff to the creditor.
Since the creditor’s outside option is positive, in fact πc ≥ I, no lending can take place.
4.6.2 Proof of Lemma 36
First recall the expression for πse from lemma 35:
πse =
(1− β)Q








First observe that the first term in the product,
f(θ) :=
Q
r(r + βq) + (1− β)Q(r + αβq) ,











r(r + βq) + (1− β)Q(r + αβq))−Q(rβq′ + (1− β)Q′(r + αβq) + (1− β)αβQq′)




r(r + βq) + (1−Q)(1− β)Q(r + αβq))−Qq′(rβ + αβ(1− β)Q
[r(r + βq) + (1− β)(r + αβq)Q)]2 .
To see that this expression is positive, recall the assumptions on the matching function
from subsection 4.3.1. Namely q′ < 0 and Q′ > 0. Thus −q′ is positive and so are all























Assumption 4.4.2 and the result above that f ′ > 0 say that the first term is positive. f
is positive because all terms are positive. And −q′ > 0 as above. Thus πse is increasing
in competition θ.
4.6.3 Proof of Proposition 37
First note that πse and πc as written in lemma 35 are continuous in θ since q and Q are
continuous in θ and the denominators are always positive. Thus we must just show
that an entrepreneur who has an ℓ-type differentiated project chooses δ = d when
θ → 0 and that an entrepreneur who has an h-type differentiated project chooses δ = s
when θ →∞. That is to say that inequality (ICℓ) is violated for low θ and inequality
(ICh) is violated for high θ.























Consider first the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur with an ℓ-type differen-
141




















α∆V + Vs − I
))
≥ 0.
This is violated by the first condition in the statement of the proposition. Therefore
there is no efficient equilibrium when θ is small.
Now consider the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur with an h-type differen-












This is violated by the second condition in the statement of the proposition. Therefore
there is no efficient equilibrium when θ is large.
4.6.4 Proof of Proposition 39
From Lemma 38 observe that πse → 0 as θ → 0. Recall from the creditor’s incentive










That is to say that relationship lending restores efficiency for low θ—it eliminates the
over-differentiation inefficiency—whenever k ≤ αβ∆V .
4.6.5 Proof of Proposition 40
This proof involves comparing the incentive constraint (ICh) of the entrepreneur with
the high-type differentiated project across the equilibria described in Lemma 35 and
Lemma 38. This is the incentive constraint that says the entrepreneur who has an





but πse depends on the equilibrium. Write π
s
e|η=a for the entrepreneur’s value function
as written in Lemma 35 and πse|η=r as written in Lemma 38.
Now, immediately from the expressions written in the lemmata,
πse|η=r − πse|η=a =
(1− β)qQk
r(r + βq) + (1− β)Q(r + αβq) > 0.










That is to say if e over-standardizes given the (η = a, δh = d, δℓ = s) equilibrium then
he would also over-standardize given the (η = r, δh = d, δℓ = s) equilibrium.
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